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ARTICLES
DEEPLY AND PERSISTENTLY
CONFLICTED:
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
CURRENT REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT
Timothy E. Lynch'
-Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of
cards falters. ;o).'
ABSTRACT
Credit rating agencies have a pervasive and potentially
devastating influence on the financial well-being of the public. Yet,
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IU.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF'S
ExAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 12 n.8 (2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SEC,
SUMMARY REPORT] (quoting an email written in December 2006 by an analytical manager in
the Collateral Debt Obligation (CDO) group of a major credit rating agency to a senior
analytical manager within the same group). The full quotation from this email states that "the
rating agencies continue to create an 'even bigger monster-the CDO market. Let's hope we are
all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters.;o)."' Id.
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despite the recent passage of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act,
credit rating agencies enjoy a relative lack of regulatory oversight.
One explanation for this lack of oversight has been the appeal of a
self-regulating approach to credit rating agencies that claim to rely
deeply on their reputational standing within the financial world.
There are strong arguments for doubting this approach, including the
conflicting self-interest of credit rating agencies whose profits are
gained or lost depending on their ability to lure the business of
issuers who will always be seeking the highest rating possible. In
recent months, government and press investigations initiated largely
in response to the economic turmoil surrounding subprime mortgages
have led to additional skepticism about the self-regulating abilities of
credit rating agencies' reputational integrity concerns.
This Article argues that the current underlying theories of credit
rating regulation may be prone to fail because they leave in place the
fundamental conflicts of interest that have been shown to induce
profit-seeking credit rating agencies to over-rate securities,
indicating to investors a lower amount of default risk than actually
exists. If investors were able to fully discount or adjust for this
misinformation, a goal of the disclosure requirements of the Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act, additional governance may not be
required Unfortunately, there is considerable empirical and
anecdotal evidence in business as well as behavioral finance
literatures that many investors using credit rating agency ratings are
simply not able to perform such adjustments.
This Article develops a governance framework that accounts for
the rating agencies' conflicts of interest problem and makes the
proposal that public funding augment the current system Of
evaluating creditworthiness, either through the establishment of a
publicly-funded independent credit rating institution, through the
hiring of private rating agencies by the government to rate certain
securities, or through the use of the tax system to incentivize
private rating agencies to issue more accurate ratings. This Article
argues that such mechanisms could provide valuable information
to investors, could illuminate the reputational compromises credit
rating agencies often make in favor of profit-seeking, and, thus,
could mitigate a signi~ficant amount of the errant information
currently produced by private-sector credit rating agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
The economy is currently in a period of turmoil. U.S. housing
prices have fallen significantly.2 Foreclosures are up.3 In order to
stabilize the housing market and the economy, the federal government
has nationalized Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac.4 The federal
government has taken large ownership interests in several other
financial institutions, including one of the world's largest insurance
companies . Three of the largest independent Wall Street investment
banks have collapsed . Several large commercial banks have
2 See Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Home Price Declines Worsen As We Enter the
Fourth Quarter of 2008 According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Dec 30, 2008),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/CSHomePrice -Release_1I23062.pdf (showing
that average home prices have fallen nationally since the third quarter of 2006 and have fallen
by over 19 percent from 2007 to 2008). See also Anton Troianovski, Year-End Review of
Markets & Finance 2008 -Real Estate Markets Still Plumb for Bottom, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
2009, at R7 ("One in 10 homeowners with a mortgage is either in foreclosure or delinquent on
payments ... )
3See Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies Increase, Foreclosure Starts
Flat in Latest MBA Delinquency Survey (Dec. 5, 2008) http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/
PressCenter/66626.htm (reporting that 2.97 percent of U.S. mortgage loans were in the process
of foreclosure in the third quarter of 2008, a record high); see also Troianovski, supra note 2.
4James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Seizes Mortgage Giants; Government Ousts CEOs of
Fannie, Freddie; Promises up to $200 Billion in Capital, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at Al
(noting that together the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) provide funding for approximately
three-quarters of new home mortgages in the U.S.). Together Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also
own or guarantee approximately 50 percent of the country's home mortgages and own
approximately $5 trillion in mortgages. James R. Hagerty et al., U.S. Mulls Future of Fannie,
Freddie; Administration Ramps Up Contingency Planning as Mortgage Giants Struggle, WALL
ST. J., July 10, 2008, at AL
5Matthew Karnitschnig et al., US. Plans Rescue of AIG to Halt Crisis; Central Banks
Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up; $5S Billion Loan for Giant Insurer Aimed at Averting Collapse;
Historic Move Would Cap 10 Days that Reshaped U.S. Finance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2008, at
Al (reporting the U.S. federal government moving toward an emergency loan to American
International Group Inc.).
6 See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets; Focus Moves to
Fate of Giant Insurer After U.S. Allows Investment Bank to Fail; Barclays in Talks to Buy Core
Lehman Unit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at Al (reporting bankruptcy filing of Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc.); Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters,
Merrill Seeks Buyer, AIG Hunts for Cash; US. Opts to Avoid Lehman Rescue, Stirring a
Momentous Weekend for American Finance; Traders Brace for a Chaotic Monday, WALL ST.
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collapsed, including the largest to collapse in U.S. history.7 Equity
values have plummeted.' There is a worldwide credit crunch.9 The
U.S. economy is in a recession,' 0 and the economic downturn is felt
globally.'" In an attempt to halt the economic decline, the federal
government has authorized the U.S. Treasury to purchase up to $700
billion of bad mortgage-related debt securities from private etis.12
Why has the economy entered such a tumultuous period? A partial
answer is that too many institutional investors poured too much
money into the U.S. housing market during the housing bubble of the
2000s, 13 and when the housing bubble burst, an ensuing wave of
J., Sept. 15, 2008, at Al (reporting the rushed sale of Merrill Lynch & Co. to Bank of America
Corp.); Robin Sidel et al., The Week that Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear Stearns,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at AlI [hereinafter Sidel et al., The Week] (reporting the fall of Bear
Stearns Company, Inc.); Robin Sidel et al., J.P. Morgan Buys Bear in Fire Sale, as Fed Widens
Credit to Avert Crisis; Ailing Firm Sold for Just $2 a Share in U.-Backed Deal, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 2008, at Al (describing the bailout of Bear Steams).
7David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, Wachovia Chooses Wells Fargo, Spurns Citi; Deal
Avoids Need For Taxpayer Cash; Pandit Vows a Fight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2008, at Al
(reporting Wells Fargo's agreement to takeover struggling Wachovia Corp. only days after the
government engineered a proposed takeover of Wachovia by Citigroup Inc.); Damian Paletta et
al., Crisis Deepens as Big Bank Fails; IndyMac Seized in Largest Bust in Two Decades, WALL
ST. J., July 12, 2008, at Al (reporting the seizure of IndyMac Bank by federal banking
authorities); Robin Sidel et al., WaMu Fails, Is Sold off to J.P. Morgan; Biggest Banking
Collapse in US. History; Government Arranges a Deal to Safeguard Huge Thrift 's Deposits,
Branches, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at AlI (reporting the collapse of Washington Mutual Inc.
and its purchase by J.P. Morgan Chase and Co.).
8 US STOCKS-Wall Street Set for New Year Gain after Bleak 2008,
REUTERS, Jan. 2, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews
/1dCAN0227916820090102 ("In 2008 as a whole, the Dow [Jones Industrial Average] fell
33.8 percent, for its bleakest year since 1931; the S&P skidded 38.5 percent; and the Nasdaq
posted its worst year ever, with a 40.5 percent drop."). As of December 31, 2008, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average dropped almost 40 percent since its all-time high of 14,279.96 on
October 11, 2007. See Historical Prices for .DJI (Dow Jones Industrial Average),
http://fmnance.google.com/finance/historical?q=INDEXDJX:.DJI (last visited Feb. 22, 2009)
(historical data).
9TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'Ns, REPORT ON
THE SUBPRIME CRIS 1, 3 (May 2008), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/
pdt7IOSCOPD273.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT]; see also Justin Lahart et al.,
World Economy Shows New Strain; European Output Shrinks; U.S. Inflation Jumps; Fresh
Worries in Developing Nations, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2008, at Al.
10 Press Release, Business Cycle Dating Comm., Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity (Dec 11, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.pdf (reporting that the U.S. economy has been in a
recession since economic activity peaked in December 2007).
11 See Mark Landler, World Bank Expects Pain Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2008, at
B I; Press Release, World Bank, Global Slump Hits Developing Countries as Credit Squeeze
Impedes Growth and Trade; Tensions in Commodity Markets Ease (Dec. 9, 2008), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/F16CTJAHWO.
12 David M. Herazenhorn, Bush Signs Bill, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
13 See Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Record Low Annual Declines Recorded
in May 2008 for the S&P/Case-Shiller Composite Home Price Indices (July 29,
2008), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/CSHomePriceRelease-072943.pdf
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foreclosures drove down the value of these investments, forcing some
investors into insolvency. 1 Many institutional investors, in order to
meet capital and liquidity requirements, have had to restrict lending'"
while seeking additional capital.'16 This has led to the widespread
credit crunch 17 and a general economic slwow.1 This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that many of the security vehicles used to
invest in the housing market-mortgage-backed securities ("MBSs")
and collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs") based on MBSs-are
often complexly structured,' 9 and their underlying assets (thousands
of individual mortgages) are often legally distant and largely
invisible. 2 0 This complexity and opacity has resulted in a situation
[hereinafter Standard & Poor's, Case-Shiller] (showing dramatic annual increase in national
average housing prices between 1998 and 2006, followed by a steep decline); ROBERT J.
SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 14 (2d ed. 2005) (explaining that the "rocket-taking-off'
boom in home prices in the U.S. since 1997 cannot be explained "in terms of building costs,
population, or interest rates"); see also Vincent Reinhart, Op-Ed., Securitization and the
Mortgage Mess, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2008, at A 13 (a fonmer director of the Federal Reserve's
Division of Monetary Affairs referring to the "housing bubble" and the "housing-market
collapse").
14 See, e.g., E.S. Browning, Banks Rally, but Demons Still in Vault; Interbank Lending,
House Prices Suggest the Worst Isn 't Over; a Bear Bounce?, WALL Sr. J., July 28, 2008, at Cl1;
Damian Paletta et al., Countrywide Seeks Resvcue Deal; Bank of America Eyes Stricken Home
Lender as Crisis Grinds on, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2008, at Al; Paletta et al., supra note 7; Sidel
et al., The Week, supra note 6.
15 See Browning, supra note 14 (noting that banks have been forced by recent
foreclosure-induced uncertainty and failing confidence in other banks to reduce the amount of
their borrowing and lending).
16 See. e.g., Jonathan Karp & Michael Corkery, Middle East Players Arrive; Government
Investment Funds, Individuals Fill Need for Cash on Developments Across US, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 12, 2008, at B9 (reporting American financial institutions are selling interests to Persian
Gulf sovereign-wealth funds in order to acquire necessary capital); Tom Lauricella, Signs Say
Economic Recovery Isn 't Here; Oil, Dollar Offer Hope, but False Starts Pepper Bear Markets
with Uncertainty, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, at ClI.
17 See sources cited supra note 9.
'8 See Lahart et al., supra note 9; Ravi Balakrishnan, United States Manages First
Housing Bust in Four Decades, IMF SURV. MAG., Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.imff org/external/
pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/CAR801O8A.htni ("The unusual nature of the ongoing crisis in the
financial and housing sectors leaves the [economic] outlook highly uncertain."); see also Scott
Patterson, How the Credit Mess Squeezes You, Wall St. J. Online, Mar. 2, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120441177639305685.html (describing the connection between
the housing bubble bursting, subprime mortgages, the credit crunch, and the economic slump).
19 Mortgage-backed securities are debt securities whose payments are based on the total
principal and interest payments of a pool of mortgages. The pool may consist of thousands of
mortgages. Collateralized debt obligations are securities whose securities are also based on a
pool of underlying assets, and MBS-based CDOs are CDOs which are based on a pool of MBSs,
often as many as 200 MBSs. See ANDREw DAVIDSON ET AL., SECURrnIZAION: STRUCTURING
AND IN-VESTMENT ANALYSIS 24-26 (2003) (discussing a variety of factors that go into credit
rating agencies' determination of financial strength of securitization); U.S. SEC, SUMMARY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7. The vast majority of MiBSs and CDOs are purchased and held by
institutional investors. IOSCO, SUBPRimE REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
20 MBSs and CDOs based on MBSs are highly structured, meaning, essentially, that the
rights to the cash flows from the pool of underlying securities are segmented among different
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where many security holders do not know the exact nature of the risks
they bear,2 ' and the markets cannot easily value these securities.2 As
a result, liquidity in these products has shrunk considerably, 23
financial uncertainty is pervasive 24  and the credit market has
constricted considerably. 25
But such an explanation merely raises additional questions. The
most immediate question is why did so many ostensibly sophisticated
institutional investors invest so heavily in the U.S. housing markets,
especially during a housing bubble 26  and during a time when
subprime mortgages constituted such a large percentage of home
loans originated in the U.S. 27 To begin to answer this question, it is
worth investigating the role of the many actors who contributed to the
creation of the current turmoil. Some culprits are commonly
discussed-unethical home loan originators who preyed on
unsophisticated homebuyers whose creditworthiness prevented them
from taking out traditional home loans; 28specltr who took
advantage of the inexpensive financing to ride the seemingly endless
wave of increasing housing values; 29 and irresponsible homebuyers
who took out home loans which they did not understand or could not
tranches of securities. Different tranches bear different degrees of risk and are priced, in part,
relative to their respective levels of risk. This differentiation is obtained by payment
subordination, over-collateralization, swaps, and other credit enhancements. See DAVIDSON ET
AL., supra note 19, at 24-26; U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7. The
combination of the thousands of underlying assets, the complex structuring, and the credit
enhancements make the risks of MIBSs and related securities difficult to thoroughly analyze and
understand and makes the securities, therefore, often difficult to price. IOSCO, SuBPRIME
REPORT, supra note 9, at 10, 22.
21 Cf 10SCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 5 (noting that "[tihe uncertainty
regarding the quality of [mortgage-relatedj CDO ratings" created a "liquidity crisis" which had
effects in other areas, "particularly in the market for commercial paper").
22 See id. at 10, 13, 17-19.
23 Id at 5.
24 Idat 4-5.
25 See sources cited supra note 9.
26 Standard & Poor's, Case-Shiller, supra note 13 (showing eight year continued increase
in national home price averages followed by steep decline).
27 John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments
in US. Subprime Mortgage Markets 6 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. wP/07/188,
July 2007), available at http://www.imfforglexternal/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07l 88.pdf. Although
until 2003 the percentage of all mortgage originations which were not "prime conformaing" was
very low, by 2006 approximately half of all mortgage originations were "nonprime" loans
(subprime: 21%, and Alt-A: 25%). Id. Such nonprime loans totaled almost $1.5 trillion in 2006.
I.28 See. e.g., Kai Wright, The Subprime Swindle, THE NATION, July 14, 2008, at 11; Is Wall
Street to Blame for the Mortgage Meltdown? (Fresh Air From WHY-Y NPR radio broadcast July
8, 2008).
29 See, e.g., George Anders, Now, Even Borrowers with Good Credit Pose Risks, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 19, 2007, at A2.
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afford to repay. 3 0 Some culprits, however, are less well known. Three
additional ones include: (i) the investment banks who sponsored the
creation of many MBSs and the CDOs based on them; (ii) the three
large American credit rating agencies, Moody's Investor Service
("Moody's"), Standard and Poor's Rating Services ("S&P"), and
Fitch Ratings, Ltd. ("Fitch"), each of which appear to have been
recklessly, if not knowingly, rating MBSs and related securities 3 1 as
less risky than they actually were and, consequently, to have fed
investor appetites for MBSs and other U.S. real estate financial
products; and (iii) the institutional investors themselves, who appear
to have been relying too heavily on credit ratings as substitutes
for-rather than supplements to--their own internal risk assessments.
This Article addresses the inter-relational dynamics of these last
three actors, and, in particular, focuses on the actions and incentives
of the credit rating agencies-the actors positioned imimediately
between the issuing investment banks and institutional investors. It
addresses why the credit rating agencies might issue inaccurately high
ratings, and why institutional investors might have been encouraged
by inaccurately high credit ratings to invest increasingly large sums of
money into the U.S. housing market, and then offers a possible
framework for addressing these interrelated problems. Such
investment fueled the housing bubble312 and created the conditions that
would not only result in the current economic turmoil but would
expose both the bad behavior of the credit rating agencies and a
certain lack of sophistication on the part of institutional investors.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the credit rating agencies,
their operations, and their importance within the capital markets, as
well as how their ratings are used in regulating the investments of
certain institutional investors. All large American credit rating
agencies earn the vast majority of their revenues from securities
issuers who contract with credit rating agencies to have their
securities rated.3 Part 11 examines the conflict of interest
inherent in this "issuer-pays" revenue model.
30 See, e.g., Kimberley E. Strassel, Op-Ed, The Bailout Briar Patch, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2 1,
2008, at A12 (reporting that the presidential administration had distinguished between those
homebuyers who have been victims of predatory lending and those who merely "signed up for
an unaffordable home").
31 Throughout this Article, any reference to "mortgage-backed securities, .. .MB~s,"
"residential MB~s, .. .RMB~s," or "mortgage-related securities" is meant to include references
to all securities based on a pool of residential mortgages, including collateralized debt
obligations based on a pooi of MB~s.
32 Reinhart, supra note 13 (stating that asset securitization helped "to enable the housing
bubble").
33 See infra Part I.A.
234 Vol. 59:2
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The credit rating agencies have acknowledged the existence of the
issuer-pays conflict of interest and the more benign risk of error but
have typically downplayed their significance, stating that their
reputations are far too valuable to the success of their businesses for
them to either succumb to the biases inherent in the issuer-pays
revenue model or issue inaccurate ratings.3 Part III details this
"'reputation" argument, presents theory-based counterarguments to it,
and then presents empirical and anecdotal evidence indicating that a
generalized concern for their reputations has not satisfactorily
prevented rating agencies from succumbing to those biases for the
sake of short-term profits.
Part IV examines the regulatory regime governing the credit rating
industry, specifically the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006
and the rules promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Act. This Part
highlights some of the rules recently announced and some currently
being proposed by the SEC to address some of the regulatory failures
identified during the current subprime episode. Notably, the Act, the
current SEC rules, and the proposed SEC rules do not adequately
regulate the fundamental problem of the rating agencies-the issuer-
pays conflict of interest. In the current regulatory environment, credit
rating agencies are permitted to use the issuer-pays model, but if they
do, they must publicly disclose that fact. Part V details why such a
disclosure requirement is unlikely to ensure adequate credibility and
accuracy of ratings.
In a world of increasing financial complexity, opacity, and
interconnectedness, 35 financial crises and economic turmoil could
34 U.S. SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 41-42 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov-
news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT].
35 See Garry J. Schinasi, Preserving Financial Stability, in ECONOMIC ISSUES (Int'l
Monetary Fund, Econ. Issues Series No. 36, Sept. 2005), available at http://wwxv.imf.orgl
extemallpubs/t/issues/issues36/ei36.pdf. Complex structured instruments and derivatives of all
types are becoming much more numerous. See Greg Ip & Rebecca Christie, Derivatives Growth
Has Helped Banks, Greenspan Says, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2002, at A2. Hedge funds, whose
investment strategies and portfolios are normally opaque to the public, are also growing. U.S.
SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vii (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov-
news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SEC, 2003 HEDGE FUND REPORT] ("The
hedge fund industry recently [through 2003] has experienced significant growth in both the
number of hedge funds and the amount of assets under management. Based on current
estimates, 6,000 to 7,000 hedge funds operate in the United States managing approximately
$600 to $650 billion in assets. In the next five to ten years, hedge fund assets have been
predicted to exceed $1 trillion."); ALEXANDER INEICHEN & KURT SILBERSTEIN, AlMA's
RoADMAP To HEDGE FUNDS 18 (2008), available at http://www.aima.org/enl
knowledge centre/educationlaimas-roadmap-to-hedge-funds.cfin ("The overall annual growth
rate for the whole [hedge fund] industry from 1990 to 2007 was around 23.5% in terms of assets
under management."). More relevantly for our purposes, many hedge funds keep the details of
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prove to be increasingly profound. These same factors increase
the potential for credit rating agencies to engage in public welfare
harming, short-term profit seeking behavior while simultaneously
decreasing the ability of investors to adequately monitor, discount,
and discipline the rating agencies, thus making it more pressing to
find ever more reliable governance and regulatory mechanisms to
ensure a satisfactory level of financial stability and sustainability. Part
VI of the Article proposes a governance structure with more public
participation, which would increase financial stability, promote
greater credibility within the private-sector credit rating industry and
enable investors to make better informed investment decisions. Three
possibilities are discussed under this proposal: (i) the establishment of
an independent, publicly-funded credit rating agency, (ii) the use of
public funds to hire rating agencies which do not use the issuer-pays
revenue model to conduct credit analysis on selected securities, and
(iii) the use of the tax system to incentivize rating agencies to issue
more accurate credit ratings. In a spirit of prompting future
discussion, Part VI briefly provides the structural outline of each
proposal, describes some of their potential benefits, and identifies
some implementation obstacles.
I. CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
A. Credit Rating Agency Fundamentals
In an investment world where information is often difficult
to obtain and adequately process, credit rating agencies play a
particularly relevant and important role.3 The precursors to the
their investment strategies concealed from their own investors. U.S. SEC, 2003 HEDGE FUND
REPORT, supra, at 46-47 ("Hedge fund advisers typically provide infonmation to investors
during an investor's initial due diligence review of the fund, although some, more proprietary,
information may not be provided until after the investor has made a capital commitment to the
fund, if at all. . .. In practice, even very large and sophisticated investors often have little
leverage in setting terms of their investment and accessing information about hedge funds and
their advisers.").
36 For comprehensive descriptions of credit rating agencies, see generally, RATINGS,
RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Richard M. Levich et a]. eds., 2002);
TIMOTHY J. SINCLAIR, TH{E NEW MASTERS OF CAPITAL: AMERICAN BOND RATING AGENCIES
AND THE POLITCS OF CREDITWORTHINESS (2005); Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit
Rating Industy, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. Q. REv., Summer-Fall 1994, at 1, 1; Claire A. Hill,
Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 47 (2004); Frank Partnoy, How and Why
Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN
THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robcrt E. Litan eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers]; Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 622
(1999) [hereinafter Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down]; Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of
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modem credit rating agencies were mercantile credit agencies. First
formed in the mid-l800s, these agencies assessed the ability of
merchants to pay their financial obligations317  and sold these
assessments to businesses who would then use this information to
help them decide whether or not to lend or provide other financing to
a particular merchant and, if so, under what terms .38 In 1909, John
Moody formed the first company focused specifically on assessing
the ability of businesses to pay amounts due on the bonds they
issued.3
Modem credit rating agencies are private, for-profit companies
that assess the creditworthiness of the issuers of debt and debt-like
securities.4 Securities issuers often provide rating agencies with
nonpublic information about themselves and about their securities.4
With this information, credit rating agencies make creditworthiness
assessments, and, then, most rating agencies, including the very
largest, make their opinions, or ratings, publicly available.4 Credit*
Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 Am. J. CoMP. L. Supp. 341 (2006); see also U.S.
SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 5.
37 For a brief description of the historical evolution of the credit rating industry, see
generally. SINCLAIR, supra note 36, 22-27; Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 1-5; Partnoy,
Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36, at 636-54; Richard Sylla, An Historical Primer on the
Business of Credit Rating, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 19, 21-22.
38 Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 1.
39 Id. at 2.
40 Such securities include long-term corporate bonds, mid-term corporate bonds,
short-term corporate notes, municipal bonds, asset-backed securities, preferred stocks, privately
placed notes and bonds, commercial paper, bank certificates of deposits, mortgage hacked
securities, and other collateralized debt obligations. Some rating agencies rate other payment
capabilities, such as the claim paying ability of insurance companies and the performance risk of
mortgage servicers. Id at 3.
41 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 2 1-22, 26. Information considered by
credit rating agencies may include the issuer's method of cash generation and its use of cash, the
nature and amount of its assets and liabilities, debt-to-equity ratios, interest coverage ratios, cash
flow predictions, budgets, business projections, amount and nature of fixed charges, advanced
notification of major corporate events, nature of its markets, efficiency and nature of its
operations, quality of its management, contractual commitments, competitors, current
government regulations, and its regulatory risks. Id. at 26. Pursuant to SEC Regulation FD,
securities issuers may not disclose nonpublic informnation to certain members of the public, such
as securities market professionals and others who may use the information for trading purposes,
without making that information generally publicly available. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii)
(2008). However, Regulation FD makes an exception for credit rating agencies so that securities
issuers can make their non-publicly available information available to the credit rating agencies
for purposes of credit analysis. The SEC justified the credit rating agency exception because
rating agencies use such information to develop and publicly issue a generalized opinion about
the creditworthiness of the issuer. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b); Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,719-20 (August 24, 2000).
42 See, e.g., U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 21-22 (describing the
internal processes used by credit rating agencies to collect and analyze information and decide a
rating).
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rating agencies may rate a security upon its initial issuance and may
maintain surveillance over a security afterwards, revising the rating
when and if the creditworthiness of the issuer changes.4 A credit
rating agency is, therefore, essentially a purveyor of information and
of the analysis of that information."
Traditionally, securities are given a single, letter-designated grade
on a linear scale, which is reflective of the credit rating agency's
opinion as to the likelihood of full and timely payment.4 Credit rating
agencies also publicly disclose some of the underlying methodology
and basic rationale used to conduct their credit analysis.4
There are more than one hundred credit rating agencies
worldwide.4 In the United States, the credit rating industry is highly
concentrated,4 with two firms, Moody's and S&P, each controlling
approximately 40 percent of the market.4 It was estimated that as of
2005 Moody's and S&P each had credit rating opinions outstanding
on approximately $30 trillion worth of securities.50
43 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 26.
44 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOnDY'S RATING SYMBOL S &
DEFINITIONS 1-2, 6-7 (2008), available at http://v2.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/
MDCdocs/29/2006600000424852.pdf~frameOfRef corporate.
45 See Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions,
http://www.standardandpoors.com (follow "Ratings" hyperlink; then follow "Criteria, Policies,
Definitions, & Requests for Comment" hyperlink; then follow "Definitions" hyperlink; then
follow "Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 18, 2008).
Standard and Poor's long-term issue credit ratings are based on a scale of AAA, AA, A, 13131,
BB1, CCC, CC, C, and D, with "+" and "-"..indicating a rating which is high or low, respectively,
within that ratings "notch." AAA represents a security of the lowest default risk (defined to
indicate that "[tihe obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is
extremely strong"), while D represents a security of the highest default risk ("The 'D' rating
category is used when payments on an obligation are not made on the date due even if the
applicable grace period has not expired, unless Standard & Poor's believes that such payments
will be made during such grace period. The 'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition or the taking of a similar action if payments on an obligation are
jeopardized."). Id. Complete Standard & Poor's rating definitions are available at Standard &
Poor's website. Id.
46 See U.S. SEC, 2003 CPA REPORT, supra note 34, at 21-22.
47~ See id at 36-37; see also Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial
Organizational Analysis, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 41, 46 (listing countries with major rating agencies).
481 See Hill, supra note 36, at 44. With the passage of the Credit Agency Reform Act of
2006, additional rating agencies may be able to flourish. See infra notes 57, 84-86 and
accompanying text.
49 Serena Ng, Moody's, S&P Still Hold Advantage; Law to Boost Competition in
Credit-Rating Business Isn't Likely to Pose Setback, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2006 at CS; see also
IOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 28 (noting that "some data indicates" that
Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch collectively control approximately 85 percent of the
credit-rating market).
511 Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 36, at 65-66.
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B. Revenue Model
Before the mid-i 970s, American credit rating agencies made
money by selling their credit analysis opinions to members of the
51investment community. Such purchasers are referred to as
subscribers. In the early 1970s, in part as a result of the 1970
recession and the default of Penn Central (a major railroad company)
on $82 million of debt, the investment environment began to change,
and investors began to demand that new security issues have at least
one credit rating.5 As issuers were increasingly required by the
marketplace to issue rated securities, the rating agencies realized that
they could start to charge issuers, rather than subscribers, for the
"service" of rating their securities.5 Additionally, as communication
and document reproduction technology became more advanced and
ubiquitous, it became increasingly difficult for credit rating agencies
to keep their ratings out of the hands of non-subscribers, and as
ratings became increasingly public information, the inclination of
subscribers to pay for ratings declined.514 Furthermore, as securities
and the business strategies of issuers became more complex, it
became more costly for rating agencies to conduct their analysis, and,
consequently, issuing ratings required more resources than could be
recovered solely from subscription fees. 5
Together these factors led rating agencies to create a more viable
and profitable revenue generation model, and, during the mid- 1970s,
the "subscriber-pays" revenue model was gradually replaced by the
"issuer-pays" revenue model-a model in which issuers of debt and
debt-like securities pay the rating agencies to rate their securities.5
Although credit rating agencies still have investor subscription
services, 57 it is estimated that today approximately 80 to 90 percent of
51 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 41; see also Cantor & Packer, supra
note 36, at 4; Sylla, supra note 37, at 35.
52 Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 4.
53 Id.; W.hite, supra note 47, at 47.
54 Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 4; Whbite, supra note 47, at 47.
55 See U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 4 1.
56 Id; Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 4; Sylla, supra note 37, at 35.
57 Subscribers have access to more detailed reports and analysis than what is publicly
available from the credit rating agencies. U.S. SEC, 2003 CPA RFPORT, supra note 34, at 22.
Of the ten NRSROs recognized as of August 2008, three, Egan-Jones Rating Company, LACE
Financial Carp, and RealPoint LLC, have repudiated the issuer-pays model and seem to rely
instead on the subscriber-pays model for the significant amount of their revenues.
Egan-Jones Rating Co., http://www.egan-jones.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) (reporting that
it does not have any conflicts of interest because it does not receive compensation from issuers);
LACE Financial Corp., http://www.lacefmancial.com (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) (reporting that
it is unbiased because it does not receive compensation for its ratings); RealPoint LLC,
https://www.realpoint.com/PlublicDocs%/5CNRSRO%/2ODesignation.pdf (last visited Feb.2,
2009) (discussing how RealPoint LLC is the only SEC-recognized NRSRO specializing in the
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the revenues generated by American credit rating agencies are paid by
issuers.5
Credit rating agencies also occasionally rate the creditworthiness
of issuers who have not requested or paid for this service. 59 These
ratings, referred to as "unsolicited ratings" are done at the rating
agency's own expense and are based solely on publicly available
information. Credit rating agencies also typically offer ancillary
services such as pre-rating security structuring advice. 60
C. Public Effects of the Credit Rating Agencies
It is widely acknowledged that the credit rating agencies play an
important role in the activities of the investment industry, the capital
markets, public regulation, and private contracting." The
globalization of the capital markets and the sheer scope of the
investment industry have significantly enhanced their influence.
1. Role in the Capital Markets and Investment Industry
Investors use ratings to help them estimate the default risks
associated with rated securities and rated issuers.6 Rating services are
structured finance sector that "uses a subscription-based investor model as opposed to the
traditional issuer-paid model," which, according to its president and CEO, "gives investors truly
independent, unbiased analysis and greater transparency of the process"). These three agencies,
however, are relatively small companies, and two are registered as NRSROs for only limited
classes of securities. See U.S. SEC, Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
("NRSROs"), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/mnarketreg/ratingagency.htm (under the heading
"Commission Orders Granting NRSRO Registration," follow "Release No. 34-5 8000," "Release
No. 34-57300," and "Release No. 34-5703 1" hyperlinks) (last visited Dec. 19, 2008).
58 See, e.g., U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 41 n.1 10. Credit rating
agencies still have investor subscription services. Moody's reports that $ 1.835 billion of its total
$2.259 billion 2007 revenue, or 81 percent, was revenue from determining and maintaining
credit ratings, and most of the remaining revenue was from selling subscription services.
MOODY'S CORP., FORm 10-K (ANNUAL REPORT), at 28 (2008); Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down,
supra note 3 6, at 652 ("Ninety-five percent of the agencies' annual revenue is from issuer fees,
typically two to three basis points of a bond's face amount." (footnotes omitted)).
59 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 27 n.67; Pinto, supra note 36, at 344.
- U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 42-43; Pinto, supra note 36, at 344.
61 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITH WAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 160
(2000) (',[No market watchdog] has become more powerful than the pre-eminent US rating
agencies. . ... [Every] issuer of securities in the world .... shudder[s] at the effect on investing
publics of even a hint that one of these agencies might qualifyi their credit rating."); U.S. SEC,
2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 19 ("The [SEC] recognized that, in recent years, the
importance of credit ratings to investors and other market participants had increased
significantly, impacting an issuer's access to and cost of capital, the structure of financial
transactions, and the ability of fiduciaries and others to make particular investments.").
62 See U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 38 (reporting that representatives
of non-NRSRO credit rating agencies believe that the NRSRO designation was extremely
important, in part because of the pervasiveness of rating-dependent regulation, but also "because
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particularly valuable to investors who have relatively limited
information gathering and/or analysis capacity, and, therefore, cannot
make credit evaluations as effectively or efficiently as a rating
636agency. Rating agencies also provide an economy of scale.~ In
theory, rating agencies increase efficiency and lower costs within the
investment industry since each investor need not expend the time and
energy to conduct similar credit risk analyses .65 In the case of less
resource-rich investors, it may be prohibitively expensive to collect
sufficient information about potential investments and thoroughly
analyze that information. 6 Consequently, the rating services of the
rating agencies lower issuers' costs of capital. In other words,
investors are more willing to purchase a rated debt securities offering,
despite a lower rate of return, than they would be if (i) they were
burdened with having to expend considerable resources to acquire and
evaluate all available information themselves, or (ii) they were faced
with risking their investment dollars by purchasing securities on
which they have limited information.6
the marketplace views the NRSRO designation as the equivalent of the 'Good Housekeeping
Seal of Approval"'. (quoting The Current Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the
Operation of the Securities Markets: Hearings Before the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Nov. 21, 2002) (testimony of Larry G. Mayewski, Executive Vice President and
Chief Ratings Officer, Ratings Division, The A.M. Best Company), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlightlrating agency.htm)). See Part l.C.2 for a discussion of the NRSRO
designation.
63 See David M. Ellis, Different Sides of the Same Story: Investors' and Issuers' Views of
Rating Agencies, J. FIXED INCOME, Vol. 7(4), March 1998, at 35. Based on the results of his
survey, Ellis notes that there is a large group of institutional investors that rely on their own
analysis considerably more than that of the rating agencies and, additionally, another large
group of institutional investors that rely more on the rating agencies. Ellis suggests that this
indicates that the former group consists of "sophisticated investors who can produce their own
credit analysis." Id. at 39; see also U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 28 ("Most
of the large buy-side firms active in the fixed income markets are substantial users of
information from credit rating agencies, even though they typically conduct their own credit
analysis," which suggests that smaller buy-side firms active in the fixed income markets are less
able to conduct their own internal analysis.).
64 Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox,
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 21-22.
65 Id at 12, 22 (noting that the costs associated with "each investor individually evaluating
his or her investment would be excessive" and that "6rating agencies improve the efficiency of
securities markets by acting as informational intermediaries between issuers and investors in
order to increase the transparency of securities and thereby reduce the information asymmetry").
66See id
67 But see Jonathan R. Macey, The Politicization of American Corporate Governance, I
VA. L. & Bus. REv. 10, 21, 24 (2006) (arguing that although "[iut is generally accepted that the
uninformed investors .. , clearly rely on. ... ratings..[the credit rating agencies provide] no
information of value to the investing public"); Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note
36, at 61 (stating that ratings possess "little" informational value); Frank Partnoy, The Paradox
of Credit Ratings, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra
note 36, at 65 [hereinafter Partnoy, The Paradox] (making the same argument and arguing that a
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This is especially true of securities for which information is more
difficult to gather, understand, or analyze, like sovereign debt 68 or
particularly complex securities like MBSs, CDOs, and other
structured finance products that require considerable resources to
comprehensively analyze. 69 Numerous reports have echoed the fact
that investors, because of the complexity and opacity of certain
new securities like MBSs, cannot understand these securities
completely and have relied instead on the credit rating agencies. 7 0 In
the over-the-counter derivatives markets, credit ratings are also
heavily relied upon to determine the acceptability of counterparties
and to determine the level of collateral that might be required for any
particular transaction. 7'
Rating agencies also provide a valuable service to those investors
who are not permitted access to nonpublic information or those
investors who do not have a direct negotiating relationship with the
issuer. Issuers may supply rating agencies with nonpublic information
about themselves and the security so the rating agency can conduct a
rating agency's only value is that which is contained in the "regulatory licenses" provided to
issuers when their securities achieve benchmark ratings required pursuant to rating-dependent
regulations).
68 See Roman Krdussl, Do Credit Rating Agencies Add to the Dynamics of Emerging
Market Crises? 3-4, 34 (Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Working Paper No. 2003/18, Aug. 2003)
(reporting that CRAs have "substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets
lending," where the problem of asymmetric information, even for institutional investors, exists).
69 See Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 19-20 ("The need for high ratings [on mortgage
backed securities and asset backed securities] appears to arise from . .. investors' concerns
about the quality of the collateral as well as their unfamiliarity with the complicated structures
of the securities. . .. In principle, securities with lower credit enhancements can be discounted
by the market. However, in practice, the market has trusted agencies to be prudent in the
determination of credit support requirements and has not required higher yields from issuers that
have switched to agencies with lower enhancement requirements." (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)); Greg Ip et al., U.S. Mortgage Crisis Rivals S&L Meltdown; Toll of Economic Shocks
May Linger for Years; A Global Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Dec. 10, 2007, at Al (noting that
valuing a CDO may entail valuing as many as one hundred separate securities, each of which
may contain thousands of individual loans ("a feat that, if done on any scale, can require
millions of dollars in computing power alone"), and quoting the finance director of King
County, Washington, who stated that the county "'.relied heavily on the ratings agencies... when
investing in commercial paper backed by MBS-related special investment vehicles); see also
Aaron Lucchetti, Rating Game: As Housing Boomed, Moody's Opened Up, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11, 2008, at AlI (stating that many investors who lost money in the subprime mortgage crisis
relied on ratings to signal which securities were safe to buy); David Wessel, From Credit Mess,
Lessons About Government, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2007, at A2 (stating that the huge institutional
investors who purchased RMBSs, and CDOs based on themn, "now say they blindly relied on
credit-rating agencies").
70 See, e.g., TECHNICAL Comm. OF THlE INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, THE ROLE
OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE MARKETS (2008), available at
http://www.iosco.orglibrary/pubdocs/Pdf/lOSCOPD270.pdf-, Cantor & Packer, supra note 36;
Editorial, The Moody's Blues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2008, at A 14.
71 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 28.
2009] DEEPLYAND PERSISTENTLY CONFLICTED 243
more informed credit risk analysis. Since the implementation of
Regulation FD,7 the credit rating agencies are the main conduit of
nonpublic information to the market.7
Institutional investors often use ratings, but the degree and extent
to which any particular institutional investor uses or relies on the
ratings of the credit rating agencies varies.7 Many institutional
investors-in particular those who are more resource-rich and have
greater information gathering and analytical capacities-conduct their
own creditworthiness analysis of issuers.7 But it is nevertheless
typical for these more resource-rich institutional investors to refer to
credit ratings to inform their own analysis or to include a rating "as
one of several valuable 'inputs' to their independent credit
analysis."7 Institutions with fewer resource gathering and
information processing capabilities, however, are likely to rely more
heavily on the ratings of these agencies than those institutional
investors with significant internal resources.7
72 See supra note 4 1.
73 Philippe Jorion et al., Informational Effects of Regulation FD: Evidence from Rating
Agencies, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 309 (2005) (reporting the results of their study which demonstrates
that since the implementation of Regulation FD in October 2003, the informational content of
credit ratings has increased).
74 See Ellis, supra note 63, at 37-40 (reporting the results of a survey of 205 institutional
fixed income investors, in which these institutions report that on a scale of 1-7, with "I"
indicating that they rely entirely on their own internal analysis and "7" indicating that they rely
primarily on the credit rating agencies ratings, the average score was 4.19, and no respondent
reported that they rely entirely on their own analysis (the results of this survey, conducted in
1998, may not represent current reliance)); see also Abby Schultz, S&P Faces Criticism in
Mortgage Area, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1994, at A7A. But see Macey, supra note 67, 21-24
(arguing that sophisticated or institutional investors should not use the information contuined
credit ratings and that that ratings do not even contain any useful information).
75 See IOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 9; Ellis, supra note 63, at 39 (noting
that as securities become increasingly complex, the need for specialized and sophisticated
research is more necessary, but observing, additionally, that advances in information gathering
and analyzing technology, and increased sophistication on the part of investors, fewer
institutional investors need to rely wholly on the opinions of the credit rating agencies).
76 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 21, 28; see also Ellis, supra note 63, at
36; Anusha Shrivastuva. & Emily Barrett, Treasurys See Flight to Safety: Subprime Worry
Drives Up Prices; 'It's Buyer Beware,' WALL ST. J., July 11, 2007, at C7 (reporting that an
S&P downgrade of almost 400 MBSs "served to reignite fears of broad-based selling from
anxious investors" -in other words, institutional investors are not conducting their own
complete analysis but instead are relying, at least in part, on the signals given to them by the
rating agencies). It is well known that credit rating analysts routinely take calls from and have
informal contact from subscribers, typically institutional investors, who are seeking additional
insights and further explanations of their credit rating agencies opinions. U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA
REPORT, supra note 34, at 35. Although some academics believe that there is little or no
informational content in rating agencies' ratings, see, e.g., Macey, supra note 67, subscribers
seem to disagree. See U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 35, for a discussion of
how subscriber services may create improper informational asymmetry in the investor
marketplace.
77 Ellis, supra note 63, at 39 (suggesting that the results of a survey of institutional
investors indicate that larger, more resource-rich institutions relied less on credit rating agency
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2. Public Use of Ratings as Regulatory Benchmarks
As stated above, issuers' cost of capital is reduced when a credit
rating agency collects and analyzes information for the investment
community. Their cost of capital is reduced considerably more when
ratings on their securities meet certain regulatory benchmarks. Many
institutional investors, pursuant to regulations, are forbidden or
discouraged from purchasing certain low rating securities. Federal
and state regulators, as well as international organizations, often
adopt the credit rating agencies' ratings in order to determine
the creditworthiness and credit risk of assets held by certain
regulated entities, such as commercial banks and insurance
companies, and the minimum capitalization requirements for these
entities .78 For example, rating-dependent laws and regulations 79 may
opinions than did less resource-rich institutions); Shrivastava & Barrett, supra note 76.
78 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 6-8.
79 For example, among federal law, the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of
1984 (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) defined the term "mortgage related
security" in such a way that, among other things, required such a security be rated in one of the
two highest rating categories by at least one NRSRO. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41) (2006). Of
particular relevance in the most recent financial crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act states
that corporate debt securities are not investment grade unless they are rated in one of the four
highest categories by at least one NRSRO. 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d)(4)(A) (2006). Among
regulations, a rule promulgated by the SEC pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940
limits money market funds to investing in only high quality short-term instruments, and NRSRO
ratings are used to help determine exactly what those high quality investment instruments are.
17 C.F.R. § 270.3a-7 (2008). In regulations adopted pursuant to the Securities Act, the offerings
of certain non-convertible debt, preferred securities, and asset-backed securities that are rated
investment grade by at least one NRSRO may be registered on Form S-3, the SEC's short form
registration statement, without the issuer satisfying a minimum public float test. 17 C.F.R.
§ 239.13 (2008). SEC rules governing the minimum capital requirements of broker-dealers are
also based on NRSRO ratings. See U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 6
(discussing how the SEC originally coined the term "nationally recognized statistical rating
organization," yet many others use it today). The U.S. Department of Education uses NRSRO
ratings "to set standards of financial responsibility for institutions that wish to participate in
student financial assistance programs under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965." Id
at 8. Among state law, the Code of the State of California states that California incorporated
insurance companies may invest excess funds only in debt securities which are, among other
things, rated in one of the three highest rating categories of at least one NRSRO. CAL. INS.
CODE § 1192. 10 (West 2005). The Bank for International Settlements relies on the credit ratings
of "external credit assessment institutions" to assign risks to asset classes and thus to determine
minimum capitalization requirements for internationally active banks. BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISIONS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 19-50 (2006),
available at http://www.bis.org/pubtlbcbsl28.pdf~nofi-ames=l; see also RAWI ABDELAL,
CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE 192-95 (2007); Michael R. King &
Timothy J. Sinclair, Private Actors and Public Policy: A Requiem for the New Basel Capital
Accord, 24 INT'L POL. Sa. REV. 345 (2003) (criticizing Basel Il's proposal to use (now, practice
of using) ratings to help determine bank capital requirements). For many more examples and a
fuller discussion of, and critiques of the use of, ratings-dependent regulations, see, for example,
U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 6-8; Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 5-8;
2009] DEEPLY AND PERSISTENTLY CONFLICTED 245
restrict frms in certain industries from holding securities below a
certain rating level, or may dictate that certain capital charges be
imposed on a firm when securities rated below certain levels are held
by that firm .80 Such "ratings-dependent regulations" are becoming
more and more widespread 81 and are another indication of the far-
reaching public effects of the credit rating agencies.
In order to increase the effectiveness of ratings-dependent
regulations, it became necessary for the ratings referred to in these
regulations to be established by agencies that issued credible and
reasonably accurate ratings. Over time, the concept of the "nationally
recognized statistical rating organization," or "NRSRO," came into
existence, and now most ratings-dependent regulations reference the
ratings only of the select few credit rating agencies that have been
designated by the SEC as an NRSRO.8 The Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act of 2006, discussed more fully in Part IV, provides an
administrative process for rating agencies to apply for and obtain
NRSRO registration.
Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36, at 68 1-703, 682 (arguing that such
rating-dependent regulations grant the credit rating agencies their real value and confer upon
issuers who achieve a particular level rating level a "regulatory license," a "valuable property
right[] associated with compliance with that regulation"); see also Partnoy, Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, supra note 36, at 81-83 (discussing how such rating-dependent regulations make
credit rating agencies different from other financial gatekeepers such as auditors and securities
analysts). Implicit assumptions in ratings-dependent regulations are that the ratings spectra of
different NRSROs are equivalent to each other and interchangeable, and that they are
unchanging. Historically it appears that the markets have viewed Moody's and S&P rating
scales as roughly equivalent, and the other rating agencies appear to have designed their rating
scales to harmonize with the Moody's and S&P scales. Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 13.
However, there is no express intention of coordination between the rating agencies and no
regulations requiring any particular kind of scale. Id at 15. Given this market place assumption,
an agency seeking to attract additional business might be even more particularly inclined to
soften their rating standards relative to other agencies.
80 Such a capital charge requires that firms, when computing applicable net worth for
purposes of determining whether or not minimum capital requirements are satisfied, "deduct
from their net worth certain percentages of the market value of their proprietary securities
positions. A primary purpose of these [charges] is to provide a margin of safety against losses
that might be incurred. ... as a result of market fluctuations in the prices of, or lack of liquidity
in, their proprietary positions." U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 6.
81 See Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 5-6; Partnoy, The Paradox, supra note 67, at
68-78; Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 3 6, at 704-09 (arguing that, because of the lack
of informational value in credit ratings and the potential for abuse, the use of rating dependent
regulations should be abandoned, but could be replaced with risk control regulations that instead
reference credit spreads, i.e., the difference in yield between U.S. federal government-issued
debt securities and the subject private debt security).
82 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 6.
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3. Contact-based Use of Ratings as Benchmarks
Ratings are often used by private contracting parties. Private
contracts often contain "rating triggers" in which a downgrade of a
counterparty's credit rating can trigger, among other things, the
acceleration of debt payments, obligations to provide additional
collateral, increased interest rates, and the activation of previously
inactive restrictive covenants.8 A cascading effect is possible where a
debtor's credit rating drops and such rating-dependent contractual
clauses are triggered. For example, if a debtor's interest rate is
increased, additional fixed charges may now be owed, and the
debtor's creditworthiness will be even more impaired. This
impairment may trigger other contractual provisions, which may in
turn trigger further contractual provisions. It is possible for an issuer's
rating to plummet over the course of such a cascade and even send a
firm into sudden bankruptcy.8
11. PROBLEMATIC ISSUES PRESENTED BY CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
A. Issuer-Pays Conflict of Interest
The transformation from a revenue model, in which investors paid
for credit rating agency services, to one in which issuers pay,8
created a significant conflict of interest-and should have caused
investors to question just how much to rely on their ratings.
Ostensibly, the credit rating agencies issue ratings in order to provide
information to investors that will allow investors to make more
informed investment decisions. Credit rating agencies, then,
ostensibly provide investors (and regulating public agencies) with
reliable information. However, under the issuer-pays revenue model,
credit rating agencies are sensitive to the needs and desires of their
paying clients-the issuers. As private, for-profit enterprises, credit
rating agencies have a desire-and an obligation to their
shareholders-to maximize profits. Unfortunately, the interests of
issuers in respect to their ratings often do not align with the needs of
investors to receive reliable ratings information.
83 Idat 29.
84 See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, INFEcTious GREED 333, 336, 340 (2003) (relating how any
mention of a credit ratings downgrade "created a hush" among a crowd of senior executives and
securities analysts and how Enron experienced this type of cascade four days before declaring
bankruptcy in December 2001). Some lenders have started to shy away from using rating
triggers because, though designed to provide lender protection, this cascading effect increases
the risk of sudden bankruptcy. U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 30.
85 For a list of NRSRO's which do not use the issuer-pays revenue model, see infra note
57 and accompanying text.
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Issuers want high ratings, not necessarily accurate ratings. The
higher the securities rating, the less concern investors will have about
payment default, the greater the liquidity, and the lower the issuers'
cost of capital.8 In addition, given the importance many issuers place
on the ability to tap large markets, higher ratings provide them with
access to investors whose investments choices are constrained by
ratings-dependent regulations.8 Even after a security has been issued
into the primary market, issuers have significant incentive to maintain
their ratings both to maintain liquidity and to ensure that no
disadvantageous rating-based contractual clauses are triggered. 88
The result is that, under the issuer-pays revenue model, the
interests of issuers and the interests of the credit rating agencies
necessarily coalesce, and the credit rating agencies can make more
money by providing their paying customers-issuers-with higher
ratings. This alignment occurs at the expense of the investing public
and the beneficiaries of those institutional investors that are subject to
ratings-dependent regulations. Simply stated, the credit rating
agencies have a strong incentive to issue higher ratings, whether or
not the ratings are accurate. 89 Consequently, any investor who relies
to any extent on ratings may be unknowingly bearing risk for which
they are not being compensated.
The current model of the credit rating agencies, therefore, is
built upon a fundamental and blatant conflict of interest; the
rating agencies are opining as to the creditworthiness of the
issuer--ostensibly for the benefit of investors9 0--yet the bulk of the
revenues generated by the credit rating agencies come from the
issuers, those very debtors being evaluated. 91 As stated earlier,
86 It should be noted, however, that the market price for a security is not necessarily
perfectly correlated with its ratings. To the extent the market discounts a rating, the market price
may be lower or higher than that which would be determined solely from a rating.
87 See supra Part I.C.2.
88 See supra Part I.C.3.
89 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's All About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid, " 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1408 (2002) (remarking on the basic conflict of interest faced by
gatekeepers such as credit rating agencies, "whose desire to be perceived as credible and
objective may often be subordinated to [a] desire to retain and please ... clients").
90 It could be argued that the rating agencies are also opining ostensibly for the benefit of
legislators and regulators who have adopted credit ratings, a key determinant in the calculation
of institutional risk management and capital requirements. But perhaps it is more appropriate to
say that the legislators and regulators are merely taking advantage of the fact that credit ratings
exist and are therefore using them as a proxy for more direct risk analysis and capital
requirement. See, e.g., Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 36 (criticizing
regulators for using inherently flawed credit rating agencies' ratings for such regulatory
purposes).
91 The conflict of interest associated with this issuer-pays model has been described
relatively extensively in the literature on credit rating. See, e.g., U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT,
supra note 34, at 41-42 (noting that issuing inappropriately high ratings may result from any
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although credit rating agencies generate some revenue from
subscribers, who purchase more detailed credit analysis, and from
selling other ancillary services, it is estimated that approximately
80 to 90 percent of the revenue generated by American rating
agencies is revenue from issuers requesting a rating on their issued
secunities.9 Consequently, credit rating agencies may be "captured"
by issuers-that is to say, they may succumb to the biases inherent in
the issuer-pays conflict of interest. This conflict of interest is similar
to the conflict of interest securities analysts experience when
employed by broker-dealers that do a substantial amount of
investment banking business with the same companies about which
these analysts publicly opine-a conflict of interest that earlier this
decade generated extensive federal, state, and industry investigations
and resulted in criminal charges against several Wall Street
investment firms.9
Prior to the enactment of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of
2006, the credit rating industry was largely unregulated. The
provisions of this Act and certain SEC rules promulgated pursuant to
the Act, including ones that claim to address the issuer-pays conflict
of interest, are presented below in Part IV. It is worth noting at this
point, however, that under current and proposed regulation, ratings
agencies are permitted to continue to base their businesses on the
issuer-pays model, and the fees charged are not substantively
regulated.9
number of different dynamics). For example, the credit rating agency could make more liberal
assumptions about the issuer and the securities when using its financial model, or the rating
agency might not engage in particularly probing due diligence of the issuer, or the issuers might
expressly place pressure on the agency to give the ratings the issuer desires. Since the fees
charged by the rating agencies typically are a percentage of the size of the issuance, the threat of
such pressure may be more likely, and the likelihood of its effectiveness may be greater, when
the issuer issues securities of great size and/or issues securities frequently and when earning its
continuing business would be particularly lucrative for the credit rating agency. See id at
40-43; see also Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 36; Partaoy, The Paradox,
supra note 67; Pinto, supra note 36, at 343-46.
92 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
93 Such securities analysts have been charged with overly touting the equity securities of
public companies in order to raise the market value of the shares of these companies and thus
attract lucrative investment banking contracts for their firms and raise the value of shares held in
their firm's own accounts. For a more detailed discussion of the conflicts of interest experienced
by equity securities analysts, see., for example, Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities
Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (2003); Jill E.
Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39 (2007).
- U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 41.
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B. Risk of Error Independent of Issuer Bias
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act also does not obligate
rating agencies to conduct any due diligence. Credit rating agencies
are not obligated by any law or regulation to audit the integrity or
accuracy of the information given for their analysis, and,
consequently, the quality of their analysis is, in part, a function of the
quality of the information they are provided by the issuing firms. 9 5
The SEC, however, has recently enacted a rule that would require
rating agencies to more fully disclose their due diligence policies, but
this rule does not mandate any level of diligence; diligence itself
would not be required, but, if not conducted, that fact would have to
be disclosed. 9 6
As suggested in the previous section, inaccurate ratings can result
if the credit rating agencies are captured by issuers. However,
inaccurate ratings may result independently of any capture. Inaccurate
ratings may result from (i) poor due diligence or a lack of research
resources (as a result of inadequate research skills or inadequate
financial or managerial resources), (ii) a lack of analytical resources
(perhaps resulting from inadequate analytical skills and/or inadequate
financial or managerial resources), or (iii) good faith mistakes.9
95 See id at 31-32; Pinto, supra note 36. In fact, each of the three largest rating agencies,
S&P, Moody's, and Fitch, note on their respective websites that "the assignment of a rating is
not a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information relied on in
connection with the rating." U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
96 Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 74
Fed. Reg. 6,456, 6,459-60 (Feb. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b)
[hereinafter Amendments to Rules] (discussing the final amendments to Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act instructions to Exhibits 2 of Form NRSRO, to be effective on April 10, 2009); see
also U.S. SEC, FACT SHEET: FINAL RULES AND PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO THE
NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATINGS ORGANIZATIONS AND CREDIT RATINGS,
Dec. 3, 2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/Press/2008/nrsrofactsheet-120308.htmn
[hereinafter U.S. SEC, FACT SHEET] (discussing the final amendments to instructions to
Exhibits 1 and 2 and to Form NRSRO); Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212, 36,233-34 (June 25, 2008) [hereinafter Proposed
Rules] (discussing disclosure changes to the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act). In January
2008, one rating agency reported that it would begin conducting more extensive reviews of
subprime mortgage origination practices after sampling forty-five loan files and finding "the
appearance of fraud or misrepresentation in almost every file." U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 18 n.23. Ifsa rating agency suspects that the information provided by the issuer
is incomplete or inaccurate, a credit rating agency may refuse to rate, withdraw their services, or
downgrade a rating previously given.
97 The threat of civil liability to the investing public resulting from inaccurate ratings is
limited since courts have traditionally deemed their ratings to be mere opinions protected under
First Amendment principles. Pinto, supra note 36, at 351-55 (noting that American rating
agencies have rarely been sued successfully-and that various theories from tort and from
private anti-trust law have been suggested to reach credit rating agencies in the hopes that
increased liability would incentivize them to be more diligent and reliable actors-but that none
of these theories have gained acceptance in the courts).
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111. CREDIT RATING AGENCY INTEGRITY DEFENSES
The primary defense against critiques of credit rating agencies has
been the claim that rating agencies are first and foremost concerned
about the marketplace's perceptions of, and faith in, their ability to
issue credible and accurate ratings. This "reputational" argument will
be presented below. Following a description of the argument, this
section will go on to describe the viable reasons to doubt the strength
of the argument.
A. The Reputation Defense
Defenders of the credit rating industry have typically responded to
the observation that they may succumb to the biases inherent in the
issuer-pays conflict of interest by acknowledging such a conflict
exists, but downplaying its impact. 98 Industry defenders state that a
credit rating agency's success ultimately relies on the agency's
reputation within the investment community for issuing accurate and
credible ratings, and they claim that this conflict can be, and has been
(at least until the current subprime crisis), effectively managed. 99
Their argument proceeds as follows. If the investing public were to
come to believe that a credit rating agency was captured too much by
issuers and was consequently issuing unreliable, suspect, or less than
fully defendable opinions, the credit rating agency's reputation would
be tarnished. The investment community would then discount the
value of its ratings, thus reducing market demand for its rating
services. Revenues would consequently decrease. In the worst-case
scenario, the credit rating agency would go out of business. Only
those agencies with good reputations-the collection of which,
according to industry defenders, is coterminous with the set of those
that issue accurate ratings-would survive and flourish.
98 See, e.g., Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36, at 628-36 (presenting a
comprehensive explanation, and critique, of how industry defenders claim that credit rating
agencies acquire and depend on reputational capital).
99 See U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 23, 41-42 (paraphrasing industry
defenders); Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 13 ("[T]here is little reason to believe that increased
regulation will improve the reliability of ratings. Rating agencies have had a remarkable track
record of success in their ratings, and recent rating experience [until 2002] is even more
reliable." (footnote omitted)); Vickie Tillman, Op-Ed., Don't Blame the Raring Agencies, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 31, 2007, at A9 ("Reputation and integrity are [S&P's] most valuable long-term
assets, which would make it imprudent for S&P to provide anything other than fair, objective
and independent ratings opinions."). But see Fabien Dittrich, The Credit Rating Industry:
Competition and Regulation 7 (July 13, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Cologne), available at http://ssmn.com/abstract--991821 ("Although reputation is widely
accepted as the key aspect of credit rating economics, there has been little explicit research on
it." (emphasis added)).
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Industry defenders have also stated that the rating agencies'
motivation to maintain their good reputation is, alone, adequate
incentive for them to exercise appropriate levels of due diligence;
maintain adequate analytical, financial, and managerial resources; and
conduct careful risk analysis-and that this dynamic eliminates the
likelihood of persistently issuing inaccurate ratings. 00 Again, the
argument proceeds similarly to that presented above-any agency
which persistently issued inaccurate ratings, for whatever reason,
even reasons independent of issuer-capture, would tarnish its
reputation and not survive in the marketplace.
B. Theoretical Responses to the Reputation Defense
Many commentators have found the reputation argument
compelling,' 01 and the argument may have been one of the reasons the
credit rating industry was left largely unregulated until recently. The
argument may also have served to entice the investment public into
relying more on ratings than they may have otherwise. Proponents of
the reputation argument seem to claim that outside observers should
never doubt, challenge, or regulate ratings agencies. But the
reputation argument has some serious flaws.
Reputation is merely a measurement of the perceptions of others
and is only indirectly a fuinction of one's behavior or character. A
concern for one's reputation, therefore, is only a limited check on
one's behavior. And it may be further limited if competing interests
are particularly compelling. Reputational. protection might be a
100See, e.g., U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 32 (paraphrasing the
responses of rating agencies to concerns about the accuracy and completeness of the ratings
process).
101 See Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36, at 633 (explaining the "reputational
capital" view of credit rating agencies). In fact, many commentators believe that the incentive to
maintain a positive reputation within the investor community is a particularly strong and
effective disciplinary mechanism. See, e.g., Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 4 ("While the
current payment structure may appear to encourage agencies to assign higher ratings to satisfy
issuers, the agencies have an overriding incentive to maintain a reputation for high-quality,
accurate ratings." (emphasis added)); see also SINCLAIR, supra note 36, at 29 ("The real
constraint [preventing capture by issuers] is that any hint of corruption in ratings would
diminish the reputation of the major agencies-and reputation is the very basis of the rating
franchise."); Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 14; Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main
Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to Regulation., 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1487,
1500 (1998) (reviewing FRANK PARTNoy, F.1.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON WALL
STREET (1997)) ("Rating agencies ... do not charge higher fees for better ratings. Indeed, the
only reason that rating agencies are able to charge fees at all is because the public has enough
confidence in the integrity of these ratings to find them of value in evaluating the riskiness of
investments."); Dittwich, supra note 99, at 120 ("[Tjhe reputation mechanism is very robust. A
reputable agency will never deviate from the high quality strategy; outright milking is not an
option. What, however, if the reputation mechanism does not function properly? Then an
agency will not be (fuilly) punished [by the marketplace] for a quality drop.").
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motivation, but it does not follow that it is a rating agency's sole
motivation or that no other motives (like profit-seeking) will ever
compete with reputational protection. If the reputational argument is
not as comprehensive as its proponents claim-if, in other words,
credit rating agencies are driven by motives that compete with
reputational protections-then the potential hazard of allowing it to
stand unchallenged is that investors may wrongly believe that
reputational protection is a sufficient self-regulatory mechanism to
ensure reliable ratings. This would create a false confidence in the
integrity of the rating agencies.
1. Marginal Cost, Marginal Benefit Analysis
The reputational argument assumes that being captured by issuers
and/or issuing inaccurate ratings will both be readily apparent to the
marketplace and result in an appropriate amount of reputational
damage. The argument seems to presuppose, too, that there is nothing
to gain by issuing inaccurate ratings. What is actually required is an
incremental cost-benefit analysis; any observer should ask just how
much incremental benefit a credit agency would receive if it were to
progressively succumb to this bias relative to the incremental
reputational and revenue costs. 102 It is only when the incremental cost
outweighs the incremental benefit that the cost of reputational harm
modifies behavior.
Reputational capital, once earned, can be abused, taken advantage
of, and spent in a quest for short-term profits. Economist Carl Shapiro
writes:
The [price] premiums that reputable firms earn also serve a
crucial role in inducing such sellers to maintain their
reputations. Without premiums for high quality items, sellers
would find that a fly-by-night strategy of quality reduction
would be profit maximizing. The reason is that, in markets
with reputations, sellers can always increase profits in the
short-run by reducing the quality of their products. After all,
quality reductions will yield immediate cost savings, while
the adverse effect on reputation will arise only in the longer
run. Since positive profits can be earned via the fly-by-night
strategy, it would always dominate, unless positive profits
102 See Partnoy, The Paradox, supra note 67, at 73 ("Just as rating agencies will sell
information until the marginal cost of acquiring and transferring information exceeds the
marginal benefit from issuer fees, rating agencies will sell regulatory licenses until the marginal
cost of acquiring and transferring regulatory licenses exceeds the marginal benefit from issuer
fees.,,).
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could also be earned via the faithful strategy of quality
maintenance. 103
A firm engaging in a "fly-by-night" strategy may increase
short-term profits by cutting costs, as described by Shapiro, or by
expanding the size of its market. As shall be more clearly seen, the
major credit rating agencies appear to have engaged in a fly-by-night
strategy by issuing overly-high ratings for certain mortgage-related
securities and consequently expanding their market.'04
2. Lack of Market Sensitivity
Additionally, it is not evident that the market is or has been
particularly sensitive to any rating agency capture by issuers or to the
rating agencies' failure to issue accurate ratings. Again, an observer
should ask just how inferior a credit rating agency's performance
would have to be before the market reacts in any kind of punishing
way. Given the difficulty of assessing whether or not a particular
credit rating agency is truly biased or not, the sensitivity of the market
may be extremely low. Indeed, through shrewd management,
marketing, and tacit or explicit cooperation with issuers and other
industry players, it may be possible to take advantage of certain
cognitive biases and common heuristics' 05 to reduce the market's
sensitivity to any failures on the part of the rating agencies. Indeed, it
is difficult enough to determine what an "accurate" rating would be,
given the fact that it is a prediction of the uncertain future. So there is
immediately reason to doubt that investors would be particularly
sensitive to any but the grossest inaccuracies.106
103 Carl Shapiro, Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 659, 660 (1983).
104 See IOSCO, SupPRIME REPoRT, supra note 9, at 27; U.S. SEC, SummARY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 10-li figs. The SEC reported that of the three largest U.S. rating agencies, one
reported nearly a 250 percent increase in RMIBS revenue and a 900 percent increase in CDO
revenue between 2002 and 2006, another reported over a 200 percent increase in RMBS revenue
and over a 600 percent increase in CDO revenue over the same period, and a third reported
respective increases of approximately i100 percent and i180 percent. Id. The baseline revenues,
i.e., the revenues for 2002, were not given. Although S&P, Moody's, and Fitch were the subject
of the examination, the report does not ascribe any observation to them specifically and only
refers to them as "Firm I," "Firm 2," and "Firm 3." Id.
105 See infra Part V.B.2.c (discussing cognitive biases and heuristic devices).
106Se Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36, at 705 (suggesting that market-based
credit spreads are far more sensitive and responsive than credit ratings to real time changes in
the risk of debt securities).
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3. Certain Conflict of Interest Management Mechanisms
Defenders of the credit rating industry also assert that certain
organizational structures and industry realities exist to ensure that the
rating agencies would not be captured by issuers. There are reasons to
doubt the effectiveness of each. For example, defenders note that
rating agencies typically have policies in place that are designed to
ensure analysts' compensation is based on the demonstrated accuracy
of their ratings, independent of both the size of the issue being
analyzed and any inappropriate interference (from issuers or
otherwise) that might make their analysis less than objective.,0 7
However, a recent SEC report concluded that although analysts'
salaries at the three largest NRSROs were generally based on
seniority and experience, bonuses were based on individual
performance and the overall success of the firm. 108 The more business
a credit rating agency solicits, the more successful and profitable it
becomes. All things being equal, the more successfuil a business, the
higher salaries it can pay and the greater the job security its
employees have. Therefore, part of the compensation of their analysts
has not been, in fact, a direct function of their ability to perform
analyses with integrity or of the accuracy of their ratings.
Furthermore, analysts may own shares of their employer and, in some
cases, are awarded stock options as part of their formal compensation
package. 109 Such compensation-based on the market price of the
company's shares, and thus fundamentally on the future profitability
of the agency--conflicts with any claim that analysts' compensation
is free of the biases inherent in the issuer-pays model." 0
Defenders also argue that an agency is unlikely to be captured by
any particular issuer because of the fact that no single issuer accounts
for a great percentage of an agency's overall revenues."' S&P has
107 See, e.g., U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 23; U.S. SEC, SUMMARY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 27; see also Tillman, supra note 99.
108 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
10 e Lucchetti, supra note 69.
10 The profits, profit margins, and-in the case of the publicly traded Moody's-
appreciation in share price each grew greatly during the early and mid 2000s. Moody's annual
revenues and profits grew by over 20 percent for each of the five years prior to the recent
downturn. Operating margins increased by approximately 50 percent per year over the same
time period. Analysts surmise that those margins are similar at S&P and Fitch. Editorial, supra
note 70. Profits at Moody's rose 375 percent in six years. The head of Moody's structured
finance business earned $3.8 million in 2006. Lucchetti, supra note 69. Risk analysts would
have been familiar with this growth, and would have not only benefitted from it but may have,
out of economic self-interest, been doing what they could to drive its continued growth. It would
have been impossible to fully insulate them from the business aspects of their analysis and
eliminate their own conflicts of interest.
I I See, e.g., U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 4 1.
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stated that no single issuer or issuer group accounts for more than 2
percent of its total annual rating revenue." 2 One can quarrel with how
small or influential a customer who represents 2 percent of one's total
revenue actually is, for earning or losing an additional 2 percent of
revenue is quite significant. Yet if issuers are treated with particular
diligence or probed too deeply, or receive opinions which are harsher
than they could receive at competitor rating agencies, issuers may
take their business to other agencies-and there need not be too many
"4small" customer defections before an agency's overall revenues are
seriously impaired. The issuer-pays conflict of interest can be seen,
therefore, as a systemic problem, not merely one that operates on the
basis of individual issuer-customers.
Defenders also assert that appropriate and effective organizational
firewalls are in place to prevent credit rating analysts, rating
committee members, or any other person involved in risk analysis
from interacting with issuers in the solicitation of new business and
fee negotiations." 3 The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act itself does
not require that NRSROs maintain such organizational firewalls, but
the SEC has recently announced a rule that would expressly require
firewalls."14 However, the mere existence of firewalls should raise
doubts about their effectiveness,"' and the mere need for firewalls
should raise doubts about the reliability of any rating.
Additionally, credit rating agencies publicly disclose some of their
ratings methodologies and procedures in an effort to counter concerns
about the dangers of insufficient diligence and a propensity to issue
inaccurate ratings. Disclosure, it was argued, would allow third
parties, including investors and other credit rating agencies, to
evaluate a firm's methods and procedures and come to market-wide
conclusions about the credibility and accuracy of a rating agency's
'1Id. at 41 n. 113.
113 See, e.g., id at 41-42; see also Tillnman, supra note 99.
114 Amendments to Rules, supra note 96, at 6,467 (announcing the final version of new
rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(6), to be effective on April 10, 2009, that will prohibit an
NRSRO from "issuing or maintaining a credit rating where the fee paid for the rating was
negotiated, discussed, or arranged by a person within the NRSRO who has responsibility for
participating in determining or approving credit ratings or for developing or approving
procedures or methodologies used for determining credit ratings, including qualitative and
quantitative models."); see also Proposed Rules, supra note 96, at 36, 227 (discussing the rule
when originally proposed, which prohibited conflicts of interest relating to the participation of
certain personnel in fee discussions).
"' See, e.g., PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 333 (noting that Wall Street investment bankers
had defended themselves for years by touting the effectiveness of their "Chinese Walls"
between business units which were subject to a conflict of interest, when "[iun reality, 'Chinese
Walls' were about eighteen inches high; bankers often compared them to the miniature
Stonehenge in the movie This is Spinal Tap.").
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ratings.'"6 The greater the transparency, the greater the likelihood that
third parties will discover, publish, and challenge any errors.
However, as will be discussed, there are limits as to how transparent
credit agencies can or will be and as to how vigilant third parties can
or will be.
C. Empirical and Anecdotal Evidence of the Failure of the
Reputational Deftense
In addition to the theoretical objections just presented, there are
empirical and anecdotal reasons to doubt the strength of the
reputational argument-there is evidence that rating agencies have
succumbed to the pitfalls and biases of the issuer-pays conflict of
interest in the past and have issued persistently suspect, if not
inaccurate, ratings. Some of this evidence has resulted from
quantitative empirical analysis, while other evidence has been
discovered as part of investigations into the role credit rating agencies
played in Enron's collapse and the current subprime mortgage
turmoil.
1. Quantitative Evidence of Capture
In 1994, Richard Cantor and Frank Packer provided empirical
evidence calling into question the strength of the reputation
defense."1 7 Cantor and Packer demonstrated that between 1970 and
1 990-the period of time immediately after rating agencies first
adopted the issuer-pays model-"- [a]gency ratings ha[d] been a
less reliable guide . .. to absolute credit risks: default probabilities
associated with specific letter ratings have drifted [up] over tie."
With regard to rating drift, for example, Cantor and Packer show that
Moody's BBB rated bonds defaulted approximately 1 percent of the
time in the early 1970s, but, by the end of the 1980s, BBB rated
bonds were defaulting at rates of 3-4.5 percent per year. Moody's
grade B bonds defaulted at a rate of 10-15 percent per year in the
early 1 970s, but were defaulting at rates of nearly 35 percent a year
by 1989. Similar increasing default risk drift has occurred with
... See, e.g., Tillman, supra note 99 ("We strive to make sure issuers and investors are
fully aware of how we determine creditworthiness and believe that all parties are better served
when the process is open and transparent.").
I"I See Cantor & Packer, supra note 3 6. Curiously, as noted above, Cantor and Packer have
referred to reputational concerns as providing "an overriding incentive to maintain a reputation
for high-quality, accurate ratings." Id at 4.
118 Id at 9. The authors also note that, unsurprisingly, rating agencies do a reasonable job
of assessing relative credit risk: lower rated bonds do, in fact, tend to default more frequently
than higher rated bonds. Id at 9-11.
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Moody's AA, A, and B ratings. Relatedly, Cantor and Packer have
also shown that, in regard to S&P' s rating between the early 1 980s
and early 1 990s, certain indicators of credit risk have drifted, too." 9
For example, the ratio of issuers' average annual revenues to their
average fixed charges (which includes payment obligations due under
debt securities) decreased for many ratings. For example, BBB rated
firms had, on average, a ratio of approximately 2.3 in 1982, but by
1992 this ratio had decreased to approximately 1.8. In the same time
period, the ratio for firms that issued BB rated securities also
decreased-from approximately 2.1 to 1.2. In addition, issuers' debt
to asset ratio drifted up, another indication of increasing credit risk.
For example, firms who were able to earn a BBB rating in 1992 had,
on average, a debt-to-asset ratio of nearly 50 percent. By 1992 this
figure was 60 percent. Similar trends existed for other rating
categories. Cantor and Packer conclude that "[t]hese data suggest that
a relaxation of credit standards may have occurred."120
Cantor and Packer provide another set of data that appears to be an
indictment against the credit rating agencies and their reputational
defense. Cantor and Packer examined the 671 bonds that were issued
between 1989 and 1993, rated by both Moody's and S&P, and rated
below investment grade by at least one of them. Issuers of these
bonds were relatively likely to seek a rating from a third rating
agency if either (i) the ratings given by Moody's and S&P were both
near, but below, investment grade, or (ii) one of the agencies gave
an investment grade rating and the other agency did not (thus, the
ratings were "mixed"). In fact, 46 percent of the times when an issuer
found itself in the position of having a mixed rating, it sought a
third opinion. This, perhaps, is not surprising given the fact that
"investment grade" is one of the primary benchmarks found in
rating-dependent regulations, and, without an investment grade rating,
the available market of investors shrinks significantly. What is
notable, however, is that of the thirty-four issuers who had a
mixed rating and sought a third opinion, twenty-nine-nearly 90
percent-obtained an investment grade rating for the third opinion.
119 Id. at 12-13 (highlighting the risk of using ratings-dependent regulations, and noting
that if the risks associated with ratings change over time, the degree of solvency protection
anticipated by such regulations will also change over time).1201d. at 12. The authors note that the time frame examined controlled for the effects of
procyclicality (or the long-term business cycle) but suggest that this drift may be the result of
the fact that, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, corporations in general increased their
financial leverage. Id. at 11, 12. Such a fact, however, though it may contribute to increased
credit risk generally, should not translate into changing meanings of the ratings. If corporations
are increasingly leveraged on average, there should simply be fewer securities (or a smaller
percentage of securities) that receive the higher ratings.
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Among the issuers receiving ratings just slightly below investment
grade from both Moody's and S&P, approximately one-fourth of
them sought a third opinion, and, of those, almost half received an
investment grade rating with the third opinion.'12 1 It is difficult to
know exactly what accounts for such a success rate of those that
sought a third opinion. It would seem fair to assume that those issuers
with the strongest cases to make would be most likely to seek third
opinions, but this self-selection bias may not account for all the
success the third opinion seekers experienced. It is fair to question
whether or not the agencies offering third opinions were attracting
business by providing liberal and generous analysis-in effect selling
investment grade ratings to customers they wished to satisfy.
2. Anecdotal Evidence of Capture
In addition to the theoretical objections and empirical analysis
provided above, there is anecdotal evidence belying the strength of
the reputational argument. The current subprime mortgage crisis in
particular has yielded very strong anecdotal evidence that the major
rating agencies, in order to grow their business and increase their
revenues, catered to the desires of their issuer-customers at the
expense of ratings accuracy.
The Wall Street Journal published a front-page article in April
2008 exposing some of the imprudent behavior at Moody's from the
early 2000s until the collapse of subprime mortgage securities in
2007. 12Moody's analysts were expressly pushed to engage potential
client-issuers in order "to find ways deals could get done within
Moody's methodologies."12 3  Some analysts who had been
recommending lower ratings were fired or reassigned and replaced
with analysts who would give higher ratings;124 and, occasionally,
Moody's would switch analysts after issuers complained about
them.125 In the same article, a former Moody's executive is quoted as
saying that "'the rating process became a negotiation.",,'2 6
In July 2008, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
released a report, entitled Summary Report of Issues Identified in the
Commission Staffs Examination of Select Credit Rating Agencies
("SEC Summary Report"), in which members of the SEC's staff
reported the results of their examination of three credit rating
121Id at 16.
122 See Lucchetti, supra note 69.
123 Id.
124Id
125 Id
126 Id (quoting Paul Stevenson, former Moody's executive).
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agencies: S&P, Moody's, and Fitch. This examination was conducted
"to review their role in the recent turmoil in the subprime
mortgage-related securities markets." 127 By rating both subprime
residential MBSs ("RMBS") and CDOs linked to those RMBSs, these
three rating agencies had been heavily involved in the creation of a
market for such RMBSs and CDOs, and suggestions that they may
have been rating MBSs and CDOs too highly in order to satisfy the
explicit and implicit demands of issuers had regularly appeared in the
financial press over the course of the previous year.128 Some of the
SEC staff s findings lend support to the proposition that, despite the
alleged self-regulatory influence of reputational concerns, the credit
rating agencies were captured by MBS issuers and bent to the
pressures inherent in the issuer-pays business model.
The SEC Summary Report initially notes that from 2002 to 2006
both the volume of RMBS and CDO deals rated by the rating
agencies and their revenues from this business greatly increased.129
Each of the three rating agencies had policies which emphasized
the importance of providing accurate ratings with integrity, 30 and,
yet-though each had policies which restricted analysts from
participating in fee discussions with issuers-at two of the agencies,
the policies allowed the analysts' managers to interact with the issuers
and participate in fee discussions.' 3'1 Despite the policies, "[a]nalysts
appeared to be aware, when rating an issuer, of the rating agency's
business interest in securing the rating of the deal." 3
The effectiveness of firewalls that prevent actual analyst-issuer
negotiations is questionable if analysts know the business
ramifications of their analysis. More generally, an incentive to bend
or even break managerial mechanisms, whether they are internal
policies or governmental regulations, is created by the issuer-pays
conflict of interest, and this is a persistent source of tension. Many
internal agency documents--often emails-are transcribed in the SEC
Summary Report, and many are worth re-transcribing here in order to
shed light on how this conflict of interest occasionally played out.
127 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.
128 See, e.g., Lucchetti, supra note 69; Taming the Beast, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2008,
at 6 ("[The] credit-rating agencies . .. encouraged the creation of mortgage securities by
publishing misleading assessments of their quality.. .. [C]redit-rating agencies are paid by the
issuers of securities and so have an inbuilt incentive to tailor their ratings to their clients'
needs."); Paul J. Davies et al., Reputations to Restore; Rating Agencies Came under Ever Closer
Scrutiny, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), July 22, 2008, at11
129 See supra note 104.
130 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
131 Id. at 24. Both of these agencies subsequently amended their policies to restrict all
analytical staff from engaging in fee discussions with issuers. Id.
132Id.
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* A senior analytical manager in a structured finance group
wrote, "'I am trying to ascertain whether we can determine at
this point if we will suffer any loss of business because of our
decision [on assigning separate ratings to principal and
interest] and if so, how much?' 'Essentially, [names of staff]
ended up agreeing with your recommendations but the CDO
team didn't agree with you because they believed it would
negatively impact business."",33
* A business manager at one agency wrote, "'[w]e are
meeting with your group this week to discuss adjusting
criteria for rating CDOs of real estate assets this week
because of the ongoing threat of losing deals.""134
* Another business manager wrote, "'I had a discussion
with the team leaders here and we think that the only way to
compete [against another rating agency] is to have a paradigm
shift in thinking, especially with the interest rate risk."", 3 1
* A senior analytical manager wrote an email stating that
ratings methodology would have to change in order to
recapture market share.'136
* At one firm, internal memorandums were circulated
to analytical staff that indicated market share might decrease
if changes were made to its ratings methodologies' 37--a clear
breach of the firm's firewall.
* Perhaps most damning-and prophetical-of all is the
following December 2006 email quote from an analytical
manager in a firm's CDO group to a senior analytical
manager within the same group: the analytical manager
writes that the rating agencies continue to create "an 'even
bigger monster-the CDO market. Let's hope we are all
wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards
falters.;o).",, 38
133 Id at 26 (alterations in original).
134 Id. (alteration in original).
135Id
136Id.
137 Id at 25.
1381d at 12 n.8.
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The Summary Report concludes that "[rlating agencies do not
appear to take steps to prevent considerations of market share and
other business interests from the possibility that they could influence
ratings or ratings criteria".,139 The Report continues,
While there is no evidence that decisions about rating
methodology or models were made based on attracting or
losing market share, in most of these instances, it appears that
rating agency employees who were responsible for obtaining
ratings business (i.e., marketing personnel) would notify
other employees, including those responsible for criteria
development, about business concerns they had related to the
criteria. 140
3. Evidence of Error (Independent of Capture)
There is also evidence supporting the claim that, despite the
defenders' reputational arguments, even the dominant rating agencies
do not always engage in high levels of due diligence; do not always
ensure they have adequate financial, analytical, and managerial
resources; do not always use sound risk models; do not always
accurately disclose their methods and procedures so that they can be
checked; and, in short, do not always take the steps necessary to
ensure that they issue credible and accurate ratings (even independent
of any capture by issuers).
a. Lack of Diligence
Enron provides an example of a lack of due diligence and of some
of the possible consequences of a failure to audit the information
provided by issuers. The major credit rating agencies had been
opining that Enron was a very creditworthy borrower until just four
days before it filed for bankruptcy. 14 1 Enron executives may have
provided misleading information and failed to disclose relevant
information to the rating agencies, but it is widely believed that, in the
years immediately before Enron's collapse, the rating agencies failed
to invest adequate time and energy into evaluating the corporation's
creditworthiness. 14 2
An SEC report summarizing the conclusions of a 2002
Congressional Staff Report stated:
1391d at 25.
140Id
141 See U.S. SEC, 2003 CR4 REPORT, su~pra note 34, at 3.
142 See, e.g., PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 347, 385.
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the credit rating agency analysts seemed to have been less
than thorough in their review of Enron's public filings ...
Among other things, the rating analysts appeared to pay
insufficient attention to the detail in Enron's financial
statements, failed to probe opaque disclosures, did not review
Enron's proxy statements, and failed to take into account the
overall aggressiveness of Enron's accounting practices. In
essence, the Staff Report found that the rating agencies failed
to use the necessary rigor to ensure their analysis of a
complex company, such as Enron, was sound.14 3
Specifically, the SEC report noted:
[I]n the case of Enron, the credit rating agencies failed to use
their legally-sanctioned power and access [to Enron's
non-public information] to the public's benefit, instead
displaying a lack of diligence in their coverage and
assessment of Enron. The Staff Report found that the credit
rating agencies did not ask sufficiently probing questions in
formulating their ratings, and in many cases merely accepted
at face value what they were told by Enron officials. Further,
the rating agencies apparently ignored or glossed over
warning signs, and despite their mission to make long-term
credit assessments, failed to sufficiently consider factors
affecting the long-term health of Enron, particularly
accounting irregularities and overly complex financing
structures. . .. [However,] because credit rating agencies are
subject to little, if any, formal regulation or oversight, and
their liability traditionally has been limited both by regulatory
exemptions and First Amendment protections afforded them
by the courts, little exists to hold them accountable for future
poor performance.'"4
The current subprime turmoil provides even more striking
examples of a lack of due diligence and rating inaccuracies. The SEC
Summary Report states ratings were issued despite the fact that
unresolved analysis issues existed, that financial risk models did not
appear to do a good job capturing risk, that staffing in at least one
14 3 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 32 (sunimarizing a Senate staff report,
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FtNANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON:
THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS (2002)).
144Id at 18 (footnote omnitted); see also PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 296-349, 385
(describing Enron's collapse and the role of the credit rating agencies).
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agency was inadequate, 4'and that analysts at two of the three rating
agencies examined "struggle[d] to adapt to the increase in the volume
and complexity of the deals." 46 The SEC again uncovered many
internal documents that shed light on the culture and attitude of the
credit rating agencies. For example:
* One analyst expressed concern that her firm's model did
not capture ..'half of the deal's risk, but that 'it could be
structured by cows and we would rate it"",,4 7
* Another "describes an outstanding issue as 'poorly
addressed-needs to be checked in the next deal"'. and
responds to a question regarding the weighted average
recovery rate of a deal "by writing '(WARR-don't ask
D). 9,,148
Interestingly, in at least one instance, reputational concerns
actually led to persistent rating errors. At one rating agency, the SEC
discovered that a surveillance committee knew that there was an error
in a ratings model that was used to rate almost a dozen securities and,
as a result of the error, the ratings were higher than they should have
been. The committee, however, decided not to downgrade the
securities since it feared that acknowledging and reversing the error
would result in reputational harm.14 9 The committee members were
all analysts or analytical managers,150 people behind the firewall who
should have been concerned with only those reputational harms
associated with inaccurate ratings.
The obvious question here is whether Enron and the subprime
episode are merely isolated incidents of credit rating agency
analytical error and lack of due diligence, or whether this behavior is
more widespread or even typical-and it is only because Enron
collapsed so dramatically and the economy is in such turmoil that this
predilection to laxity has been exposed to public view. Given the fact
that each of the major rating agencies seemed to have behaved
similarly during the subprime episode, and given similar evidence
145 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 12, 21-22 (noting that when monitoring
the accuracy of rating on an ongoing basis after the initial issuance, resources were particularly
inadequate, and noting that if rating methodology changed, the agencies would rarely return to
previously issued securities and update the ratings based on the updated methodology).
146 Id at 12.147Id (quoting an internal agency email).
148 Id. at 12 n.8 (quoting an internal agency document).
149 Id at 26.
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from WorldCom' 5 1 and Global Crossing,' 5 2 widespread laxity seems
plausible.
b. Poor Modeling
There are reasons to believe, and many claim, that the credit rating
agencies often use poor risk assessment models. In his book exploring
greed in the credit ratings market, Professor Partnoy notes that the
credit rating agencies have adopted risk assessment models that the
President's Working Group on the Financial Markets 153 concluded
were seriously flawed.154 He explains that computer models used to
assess CDOs were merely complex ways of justifying higher
ratings,15 5 that the risk models were created by issuers, and that some
rating employees did not fully understand them.'156 In addition, he
states that analysts privately admitted that they could "tweak the
model" to make a CDO deal appear less risky.15 1
Turning to the current subprime turmoil, the SEC Summary Report
found that financial risk models did not appear to do a good job of
capturing risk.158 Despite a lack of documentation, the SEC's Office
of Economic Analysis ("OEA") reviewed what they could of the
processes and models used by these agencies to rate MBSs and CDOs
holding subprime MBS securities. The OEA reported that, when
making assumptions about the future performance of the MBSs'
underlying mortgages, the rating agencies relied upon historical data
even though "the performance history of the types of subprime
mortgages that dominated many of the RMBS portfolios .. . has been
very short[, and] the performance history that did exist occurred under
very benign economic conditions."'5" Furthermore, "the parameters of
the models were re-estimated by executing the model with new data
infrequently.' 6
15 e PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 368.
152Id. at 3 85.
153 The President's Working Group on Financial Markets is comprised of the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, the
Chairman of the SEC, and the Chairman of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.
Exec. Order No. 12,631, 3 C.F.R. 559 (1989), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
154 See PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 264.
155Id. at 3 86.
156 Id.
1
5 7 Id.
158U.S. SEC, SummARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 12, 21-22.
159 1d. at 35 (noting that such benign conditions included "consistent high economic
growth, interest rates at historic lows, very low volatility in interest rates and a period where
housing prices increased consistently year over year").
160 Id
264 Vol. 59:2
2009] DEEPLYAND PERSISTENTLY CONFLICTED26
The Financial Stability Forum,'16' a consortium of industry leaders
established to promote international finance stability, issued a report
in April 2006 simply stating that credit rating agencies "assigned high
ratings to complex structured subprime debt based on inadequate
historical data and in some cases flawed models." 6  In short, the risk
model's assumptions were not wholly justifiable.
c. Poor and Inaccurate Disclosure
The public disclosure of ratings methodology and procedures
theoretically ferrets out ratings that might be inaccurate, and
consequently assuages concerns that the rating agencies might
chronically issue inaccurate ratings. In its Summary Report the SEC
noted, however, that significant aspects of the ratings process and the
methodologies used to rate MBSs and CDOs were not always
disclosed.163  Some of the failures to disclose were blatant,'64
including disclosing that they conducted a certain analysis when they
had made it a practice not do such analysis' 6 5 and failing to disclose
that they at least occasionally overrode the results of their published
financial model to make the ratings process more liberal to issuers.16 6
161 The Financial Stability Forum is a consortium of senior representatives of national
financial authorities (e.g., central banks, supervisory authorities, and treasury departments),
international financial institutions, international regulatory and supervisory groupings,
committees of central bank experts, and the European Central Bank. It first convened at the
initiative of G17 finance ministers to promote international finance stability. See Fin. Stability
Forum, Overview, http://www.fsforum.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
162 FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING
MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 32 (2008), available at http://www.fsfontm.orgl
publications/r-0804.pdf; see also JOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 24-26 (noting
that the rating agencies' ratings methodologies for structured finance securities have
"linitations").
163 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14. The SEC Summary Report
notes, with a hint of an accusatorial tone, that as part of their NRSRO applications, each of these
agencies stated that they do disclose their ratings process. See id
164 For example, the SEC Summary Report notes that at one agency they had modeling
criteria on rating "hybrid" deals, yet did not disclose them publicly. Id. In another example, the
agency told the staff during the examination that it did not make certain analytical adjustments
when using the model, yet the SEC staff "observed instances" where the agency did indeed
make such adjustments. Id at 14.
165 In one example, a rating agency publicly disclosed that it conducted an extensive
review of loan origination operations and practices, but the RMBS group was, in fact, no longer
conducting formal reviews of origination operations and practices. U.S. SEC, SUMMARY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. This would seem particularly misleading since much of the risk
associated with subprime RMBSs was a function of risks acquired during the origination
processes, during which originators would often make loans to people who could afford them.
Such practices, often abusive or egregious, are now widely reported in the popular press. See,
e.g., sources citcd supra note 27.
166 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. The SEC Summary Report states
that "[olne rating agency regularly reduced loss expectations on subprime second lien
mortgages from the loss expectations output by its RMBS model, in some cases reducing the
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Some of the disclosure failures reflected what may be the difficult
reality of disclosing what must be, to a certain extent, a subjective
process over a complex set of financial issues. The following email
from a senior analytical officer in a structured finance surveillance
group is particularly illuminating:
"[O]ur published criteria as it currently stands is a bit too
unwieldy and all over the map in terms of being current or
comprehensive. It might be too much of a stretch to say that
we're complying with it because our SF [structured finance]
rating approach is inherently flexible and subjective, while
much of our written criteria is detailed and prescriptive.
Doing a complete inventory of our criteria and documenting
all of the areas where it is out of date or inaccurate would
appear to be a huge job-that would require far more
man-hours than writing the principles-based articles. 6
The SEC noted that the policies and procedures for rating
structured finance securities such as RMBSs and CDOs are not
satisfactorily documented, and that such lack of documentation made
it difficult for the SEC staff to determine if the processes actually
used were consistent with more general policies of the agencies. It
also noted that this lack of documentation could "impede the
effectiveness of internal and external auditors conducting reviews of
rating agency activities."' 6 8
d. Issuer-Pays Conflict Exacerbates Laxity
The subpnime episode seems to paint a picture in which the rating
agencies, captured by the issuers, were more than willing to accept
that they lacked the resources to perform credible and accurate
analyses. Moreover, any inclination to conduct lax diligence, operate
with insufficient resources, be prone to and accept errors, or make
relatively opaque disclosures (under the guise of transparency) is
exacerbated by the issuer-pays conflict of interest. The desire to
generate revenues and the explicit or implicit pressure from issuers
increases rating inaccuracies.
expected loss." Id (emphasis added). Though the rating agency might have disclosed such
reduction to a representative of the issuer, its client, who desired the best rating possible, it did
not make such disclosure available to the investing public. Id
I67Id at 13 (quoting an internal agency email) (emphasis added).
168 1Id. at 16-17. The SEC Summary Report also indicates that these rating agencies lacked
sufficient analytical resources and were understaffed and overworked. See id. at 12-17.
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This dynamic is heightened in a situation where there is a
concentration of issuers. Because of the concentration of MBS and
MBS-related CDO issuers, any one issuer could exercise considerable
influence over the rating agencies; they could deliver-or withhold-
a significant amount of business.16
The result is that short-term competitive pressures and profitability
outweighed the need for reputational protection, and the threat of
reputational harm did not deter these rating agencies from engaging in
a fly-by-night, race-to-the-bottom strategy regarding MBS credit
enhancements. Rating agencies took full advantage of their
reputational standing to engage in activities to derive short-term
profits. Now, their reputations have been seriously damaged,170
regulations have been imposed,17'1 and further regulations are under
consideration. However, it must be noted that extensive reputational
damage came only after several years of poor behavior, and only
as a result of a major economic downturn that prompted many
investors, journalists, regulators, and policy-makers to examine the
conduct of the rating agencies and expose their poor behavior. In
the short- to medium-term, until an agency's reputation has been
re-acquired, the reputational reasons to maintain (indeed, to improve)
integrity and provide accurate and credible ratings may be strong.172
However, regardless of the current strength of the self-regulatory
reputational mechanism, as reputational capital is re-acquired and
memories of the misconduct fade, the risk increases that the credit
rating agencies will gamble such reputational capital for additional
short-term profit.
IV. CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT OF 2006
On September 29, 2006, Congress passed the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act (the "Act").' It took effect on June 26, 2007.174
Prior to the Act's enactment, credit rating agencies in the U.S. were
largely unregulated. The Act was enacted in the wake of the collapse
169 See id at 32. The SEC's Office of Economic Analysis noted that the concentration of
arrangers with the influence to determine which rating agency to hire "heightened the inherent
conflicts of interest that exist in the 'issuer pays' compensation model." Id. The OEA referred
specifically to "arrangers" instead of issuers, arrangers being the sponsors of the various special
purpose issuers. See id
170 See Lucehetti, supra note 69.
171 See infra Part IV.
172 Thu the same could have been true in the aftermath of the Enron debacle, following
the outing of the credit rating agencies, they marched immediately into the subprime debacle.
173 U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1.
'74U.S. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT ON NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING
ORGANIZATIONS I (June 2008) [hereinafter 2008 NRSRO REPORT].
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of several large and well-rated companies such as Enron and
WorldCom and was designed to regulate the credit rating industry in
order to prevent similar investment debacles in the future."' This
section briefly describes the Act's goals and its most significant
content and addresses its most problematic issue-that the Act
permits rating agencies to continue to use the issuer-pays model.
The Act establishes an express process by which a credit rating
agency can be deemed to be a "nationally recognized statistical rating
organization" ("NRSRO"). 17 6 Hence, it is designed to reduce the
barriers to entry into the industry and, thus, increase competition
among rating agencies. With increased competition, some argue, the
performance of the industry will improve, and ratings will become
more accurate and credible. 177
The NRSRO application request must contain information
regarding the applicant's performance measurement statistics, 178
its procedures and methodologies for determining credit ratings ,,79
its conflicts of interest, and its policies for managing these
conflicts of interest.180 But there are no substantive requirements that
its performance measurement statistics or its procedures and
methodologies be of a certain quality. In addition, the Act does not
prohibit or necessarily dissuade the issuer-pays conflict of interest.
However, the application must include written certifications from at
least ten institutional investors stating that they have used the
applicant's credit ratings for the three preceding years.'18 ' This written
certification requirement would appear to be a proxy for a qualitative
review of the performance, procedures, methodologies, and
management of the conflicts of interest of the applicant agency.
Provided the applicant submits the listed documentation, the SEC
is obligated under the Act to register the applicant as an NRSRO,
unless the SEC determines that: (i) the applicant does not have
''adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently produce
175See Ng, supra note 49. The preamble to the Act states that it is an act "to improve
ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by fostering
accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency industry." Credit
Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327, 1327. In Section 2 of
the Act, Congress notes that the agencies are "of national importance." Id
176 15 U.s.c. § 78o-7(a) (2006).
177See, e.g., Hill, supra note 36, at 85 ("My proposal is gradually to increase the number of
NRSROs and revisit the issue of eliminating the NRSRO designation in five years, or...
[when] new firms . . . establish their reputations. .. ). But see Partnoy, Not Like Other
Gatekeepers, supra note 36, at 91 ("[Olpening the market to new NRSROs seems a weak and
perhaps counterproductive choice, even if it would be superior to the current approach.").
178See 15 U. S.C. § 78o-7(a)(l)(B)(i).
179See id § 78o-7(a)(l)(B)(ii).
180 See id § 78o-7(a)(l)XB)(vi).
181 See id § 78o-7(a)(l)(B)(ix).
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credit ratings with integrity and to materially comply with the
procedures and methodologies" described in their application package
and with certain other prescribed requirements regarding the misuse
of nonpublic information, the management of conflicts of interests,
the designation of a compliance officer, and the prohibition of certain
conduct'812 (each of these requirements is discussed below); or (ii) the
applicant has committed certain securities-related crimes or
fraudulent acts.' 83 The process of registering a credit rating agency as
an NRSRO is, then, not a form of regulation as much as it is mere
recognition of status.
Additionally, much of the materials the agency delivers as a part of
its application package are to be made publicly available upon its
registration as an NRSRO. 184 This publicly available material must be
kept up-to-date. 185 An NRSRO is required to update the information
contained in its application materials at least once a year and, with
certain exceptions, any time the information in its application
becomes materially inaccurate.186 Additionally, the SEC has recently
announced that it has adopted rules requiring NRSROs (i) to make a
detailed record of any rating actions (e.g., initial issuance, change in
grade, placement on a watch list),187 and (ii) to make this information,
for 10 percent of their ratings paid for by issuers, publicly available
within six months of any rating action.188 These public disclosure
requirements are designed to permit market participants to
independently evaluate the application materials and determine the
degree to which they will rely on this agency's ratings. 189
The goal of decreasing the barriers to becoming an NRSRO
appears to have been somewhat realized. Immediately prior to the
effective date of the Act, 90 there were only a few NRSROs
182 See id § 78o-7(a)(2)(C).
183 See id
184See id. § 78o-7(a)(3).
5 See id § 78o-7(b).186 See id.
18 Amendments to Rules, supra note 96, at 6,460-72, 6,482 (announcing the final version
of new rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(a)(8), to be effective on April 10, 2009).
188 Id. (announcing the final version of amended rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(d), to be
effective on April 10, 2009). This information would be made publicly available through the
NR5RO's corporate web site. Id.; see also Proposed Rules, supra note 96, at 36,228-30.
189 Amendments to Rules, supra note 96, at 6,461. The SEC has also announced that it will
propose a rule requiring NRSROs to disclose "ratings history information" for all of their
current credit ratings solicited and paid for by issuers that were initially issued on or after June
25, 2007, the effective date of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. Disclosure of any rating
action would not need to be disclosed until twelve months after the date of the rating action.
U.S. SEC, FACT SHEET, supra note 96 (discussing proposed amendments to Rule 17g-2).
190 2008 NRSRO REPORT, supra note 174, at 1.
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recognized by the SEC;'9' as of February 1, 2009, ten had been
registered. 192
The SEC is charged with ensuring that, when an NRSRO rates
securities, it uses only those procedures and methodologies that are
described either in its application (or its updated application) or in
other documentation required by the SEC to be kept and possibly
publicly disclosed.19 3 However, both the SEC and the states are
expressly forbidden under the Act from regulating "the substance of
credit ratings or the procedures and methodologies by which any
[NRSRO] determines credit ratings."' 9 4  Relatedly, the Act also
expressly forbids any NRSRO from implying that its registration as
an NRSRO conveys upon it any sponsorship, recommendation, or
approval by the federal government.' 95
The Act and SEC rules promulgated under the Act also require that
each NRSRO establish, maintain, and enforce policies in effect to
prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information provided to it
by issuers.'9 SEC rules promulgated under the Act' 9 7 also prohibit
NRSROs from earning more than 10 percent of their annual revenues
from a single isur'9 and from rating the securities of issuers who
are affiliated with the NRSRO or with a person associated with the
NRSRO.' 99 These rules prohibit the NRSRO from issuing or
maintaining a rating on an issuer if certain conflicts of interest exist,
including if (i) the NRSRO owns any securities or has any other
direct ownership of the issuer, or (ii) a credit analyst that participated
in determining the rating or any person responsible for approving a
rating directly owns securities of, or has any other direct ownership
191 See Ng, supra note 49 (listing S&P, Moody's, Fitch, Dominion Bond Ratings Service,
and A.M. Best Co.).
192 SeU.S. SEC, Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs").
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketregratingagency.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2009).
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c) (2006).
194Id § 78o-7(c)(2). Curiously, the SEC has the authority to suspend the registration of an
NRSRO if it fails to "maintain adequate financial and managerial resources to consistently
produce credit ratings with integrity." Id § 78o-7(d)(5). But without being able to opine as to
the substance of the ratings or the substance of the procedures and methodologies, the SEC may
not be able to judge whether or not a rating has integrity or to justify' any decision that a rating
does not have integrity.
195 See id § 78o-7(f)(l).
96 See, e.g., id § 78o-7(g); 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.17g-4 (2008). Such policies must be
reasonably designed to prevent the inappropriate dissemination of nonpublic information,
trading on or otherwise benefiting from that information, and early dissemination of a pending
credit rating action. See id197 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2).
198 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(1) (2008).
199 See, e.g., id. § 240.1 7g-5(c)(3); id. § 240.1 7g-5(c)(4).
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interest in, an issuer that is subject to the rating.200 Furthermore, the
SEC has recently announced that it has adopted a rule expressly
prohibiting an NRSRO from issuing a rating on a security if that
NRSRO or any of its analysts has made recommendations to the
issuer or other parties responsible for structuring the security about
the corporate or legal structures, assets, liabilities, or activities of the
issuer.20 1 Additionally, the SEC has recently adopted a rule
prohibiting an NRSRO analyst or anyone else involved with
approving a rating from accepting gifts from issuers, underwriters, or
sponsors of securities being rated.202 Also, as stated above, NRSROs
are now required to have organizational firewalls separating securities
analysis and rating determination operations from fee negotiation and
business development operations.20 3
SEC rules also prohibit an NRSRO from having the following
conflicts of interest unless the NRSRO has publicly disclosed the
conflict and enforces "written policies and procedures to address and
manage" the conflictS204--conflicts of interest relating to, among
others: (i) any compensation the NRSRO receives from issuers205
(e.g., those conflicts of interest included in the issuer-pays conflict);
(ii) any ancillary services provided to issuers; 206 (iii) any business,
ownership, financial, or personal relationships between persons
within an NRSRO and any issuer;207 and (iv) any affiliation of the
NRSRO with any underwriters of any securities that are the subject of
a credit rating.208 The Act also grants the SEC authority to require that
200 See id. § 240.17g-5(c)(2). The SEC has stated that "direct" ownership interests
do not include indirect ownerships such as through mutual funds or blind trusts. Oversight
of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organizations, 72 Fed. Reg. 33,564, 33,598-99 (June 18, 2007).
201 Amendments to Rules, supra note 96, at 6,465-69, 6,483 (announcing the final version
of new rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(c)(5), to be effective on April 10, 2009).
202Id. at 6,468, 6,483 (announcing the final version of new rule, 17 C.F.R. §
240.17g-5(c)(7), to be effective on April 10, 2009).
203 See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
2041d. § 240.17g-5(a).
2 05 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)(A) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(1) (2008); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.17g-5(b)(2); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(5). Rules 17g-5(b)(1) and 17g-5(b)(2)
relate to payments by issuers and obligors, whereas Rule 17g-5(b)(5) relates to payments from
subscribers and addresses situations where the subscriber hopes that a security attains a certain
(high or low) rating which would thus benefit the subscriber. Additionally, the SEC considered
proposing another rule that would expressly require that NRSROs manage and disclose any
conflicts of interest that arise as a result of repeatedly being paid by issuers and other sponsors
of structured financial products. See Proposed Rules, supra note 96, at 36, 219-22.
206 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)(B); 17 C.F.R. 240.17g-5(b)(3).
207 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)(C); 17 C.F.R. 240.17g-5(b)(6); 17 C.F.R.§ 240.17g-5(b)(7).
208 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(2)(D); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5(b)(8).
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NRSROs make certain reports and keep certain records 209  and
authority to conduct examinations on NRSROs. 1
In June 2008, in order to address some of the abuses discovered
during examinations of Moody's, S&P, and Fitch 2 1'1 and to increase
NRSRO transparency, the SEC proposed a number of additional rules
with respect to NRSROs. Many of these proposals have been adopted
and have been discussed above. Among the proposed rules was one
that would prohibit NRSROs from issuing a rating on a structured
security (including MBSs and CDOs) without disclosing information
about the underlying assets.21 This was hoped to serve two purposes:
other rating agencies would have an opportunity to issue unsolicited
ratings on the security and expose any of the hired agency's
inaccuracies, and investors would be able to better conduct their own
risk analysis and discipline any agency that issues inaccurate
ratings. 1 However, in December 2008, after considering the public
comments to the proposal rule, the SEC announced that it would
amend some of the details of this proposal. In particular, the new
version of the proposed rule would restrict disclosure of information
about the underlying assets to other NRSROs only; the investing
public and non-NRSRO rating agencies would not be privy to this
underlying information. 1 As of the date of this Article, the SEC has
not made a final determination with regard to this (weaker) proposal.
Prior to the passage of the Act, there had been accusations that
the largest rating agencies occasionally took advantage of their
dominant position to engage in overly aggressive or anti-competitive
practices .2 Among the accusations were allegations that the
209See 15 u.s.c. § 78o-7(h)(l)(B)(x) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1).
210 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-(a)(1).
211 This examination was conducted in order to determine the role of the credit rating
agencies in the economic turmoil surrounding the subprime crisis. U.S. SEC, SUMMARY
REPORT, supra note 1, at 1.212 See Proposed Rules, supra note 96, at 3 6,219-2 1.
213 See U.S. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 1, at 27 (discussing the intention of the
proposed rule).214 U.S. SEC, FACT SHEET, supra note 96 (discussing the Re-Proposed Amendments
to Rule 17g-5.)215 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 24 ("There were reports from some
hearing participants that the largest rating agencies have abused their dominant position by
engaging in certain aggressive competitive practices."). E.g., Suzanne Woolley et al., Now It's
Moody's Trn for a Review, Bus. WK., Apr 8, 1996, at 116 (reporting various allegations that
rating agencies use unsolicitied ratings to improperly pressure bond issuers to use their rating
services); Credit-Rating Agencies. AAArgh!, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 6, 1996, at 80 (reporting
several abusive practices including the fact that Moody's admitted to sending invoices to issuers
whose securities Moody's rated despite the fact that the issuer had not requested the rating
service, and noting that in some cover letters to these invoices, Moody's wrote that the billed
issuer should "reflect on the propriety of failing to pay for the substantial benefits that the issuer
reaps from our efforts").
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dominant rating agencies (i) would refuse to rate an issuer' s security
(accurately or at all) unless that issuer purchased ancillary services 2 16
(ii) would threaten to lower a rating unless the issuer purchased
217
ancillary services, and (iii) would refuse to rate an issuer's security
based on a pool of assets (accurately or at all) unless the rating agency
was awarded the business of rating a substantial portion of the assets
within the pool.2 18 SEC rules promulgated pursuant to the Act prohibit
NRSROs from engaging in certain unfair, coercive and abusive acts,
including those described in this paragraph. 1
The Act has several other provisions, including the requirement
that each NRSRO (i) designate a compliance officer responsible for
administering the policies and procedures designed to manage
nonpublic information and conflicts of interest and for ensuring
compliance with all securities laws and regulations, and (ii) regularly
furnish financial statements to the SEC. The discussion above noted
that credit rating agencies are largely not civilly liable for the
inaccuracies of their ratings .220 Nothing in the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act creates any private rights of action,22 leaving NRSROs
relatively insulated from litigation.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act did not become effective
until June 2007. Most of the credit rating agency abuses-and
investor reliance-associated with the above discussions occurred
prior to this effective date. The Act and the SEC rules promulgated
pursuant to the Act may contribute to the reduction of these abuses
and the ability of investors to appropriately discount the opinions of
the rating agencies. The success of this regulatory regime, however,
depends on both a satisfactory level of disclosure (including a
satisfactory level of truthfulness in the disclosures) and a satisfactory
level of marketplace vigilance and rationality. It is not evident,
however, that a satisfactory and effective level of disclosure is
possible, nor that satisfactory levels of marketplace vigilance and
rationality exist. Additionally, the current regulations may lead to
certain undesirable negative consequences.
216 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 23; Pinto, supra note 36, at 344.
217 U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 42-43; Pinto, supra note 36, at 344.
218 The practice of refusing to rate a security based on a pool of assets unless the rating
agency was awarded the business of rating the assets within the pool is referred to as
"notching." U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 24.
2 19 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(i)(1) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-6(a) (2008).220 See supra note 97.
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m).
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A. Issuer-Pays Conflict of Interest Persists
The fundamental problem with this regulatory regime is that it
permits the credit rating industry to continue to be founded upon a
revenue model in which issuers are the paying customers; the
issuer-pays conflict of interest persists--disclosure of such conflicts
notwithstanding. It is illuminating to point out that many of the
recently reported abuses by credit rating agencies stem from this very
issuer-pays conflict. And, indeed, given the limitations of the
subscriber-pays model and the profitability of the issuer-pays model,
the issuer-pays model and the resulting conflict of interest may
necessarily continue to dominate the industry. Despite the
requirements to disclose the conflicts of interest associated with the
issuer-pays model, if the benefits of falling prey to and engaging in
the "fly-by-night" strategy persist-whether sporadically or on a
pervasive, widespread scale-there are plenty of opportunities to
conduct biased, sloppy, or inadequate credit analysis. From a public
service perspective then, there is still cause for concern.
B. Limits to Disclosure
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act and SEC rules issued
pursuant to that Act require that each NRSRO publicly disclose
(either through its website or otherwise) select materials contained in
its most current NRSRO application. 2 These materials include,
among other things: (i) its credit rating performance measurement
statistics over short-term, medium-term, and long-term periods; (ii)
the procedures and methodologies it uses to determine ratings; (iii) its
organizational structure; (iv) whether or not it has a code of ethics,
and, if not, the reasons it does not; and (v) any conflicts of interest
relating to the issuance of ratings. 2 Additionally, the SEC is
currently proposing a rule prohibiting an NRSRO from rating a
structured security unless it also discloses to other NRSROs all the
information on the underlying assets the NRSRO used to determine
the rating.22 Making such information available, the SEC has argued,
would better enable other rating agencies to conduct unsolicited
ratings on the securities and thus better enable investors to evaluate
the hired rating agencies' performance. 2
222 See id § 78o-7(a)(e); 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-1 (i).
223 Se15 U. S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B).
224 U.S. SEC, FACT SHEET, supra note 96 (discussing the Re-Proposed Amendments to
Rule 17g-5); see also supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
225 Proposed Rules, supra note 96, at 36,219 ("The intent behind this disclosure is to create
the opportunity for other NRSROs to use the information to rate the instrument as well. Any
274 Vol. 59:2
2009] DEEPLY AND PERSISTENTLY CONFLICTED27
The rationale for the disclosure paradigm generally as a method
for securities regulation is the faith that "sophisticated investors..
[will] bring market prices into line with disclosure. 226 In the case of
credit rating agencies, the disclosure of methodologies, procedures,
permitted conflicts of interests, and policies to manage conflicts of
interest appears to be designed to allow investors to appropriately
figuratively price or discount the ratings' informational value, and,
consequently, better price debt and debt-like securities. It is argued
that another consequence of such disclosure is to expose the NRSRO
to greater scrutiny and inflict market discipline when appropriate.
However, there is a growing literature critiquing the disclosure
paradigm and questioning its ability to bring market prices in line
with fundamental values. 2 Building on this literature, the following
discussion addresses the obligation and the inevitability of the
disclosing rating agencies to limit disclosure, the limits of the
investment community to fully analyze disclosed material, and the
limits of other NRSROs to analyze disclosed materials.
1. The Disclosing Rating Agency
There are limits to how transparent an NRSRO can be. In order to
most fully conduct a detailed evaluation of the creditworthiness of an
issuer, credit rating agencies must obtain information about the issuer
and the security. Often some of this information is confidentially
provided directly from the issuer to the credit rating agency and is not
publicly available. It can be argued that their access to this nonpublic
information and their synthesis of both public and nonpublic
information into a generalized rating is the primary source of value to
the investing world. However, credit rating agencies cannot make the
nonpublic information public; it must remain confidential. 2 The
resulting 'unsolicited ratings' could be used by market participants to evaluate the ratings issued
by the NRSRO hired to rate the product and, in turn, potentially expose an NRSRO whose
ratings were influenced by the desire to gain favor with the arranger in order to obtain more
business.").
226 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity,
2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 6 [hereinafter Schwarcz, Rethinking].
227 See, e.g., id. at 23, 34 (arguing that, when a transaction is so complex as to be
"disclosure impaired," supplemental measures that would buttress disclosure and provide
"cost-effective . .. protections that minimize [informational] asymmetry or mitigate its
consequences" ought to be required, and specifically arguing that if there are any conflicts of
interest in the transaction, the transaction should be prohibited); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The
Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOKLYN L. REv. 763; HOMER KRiPKE, THE
SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
228 SCRegulation FD permits credit rating agencies to receive nonpublic infonmation
from issuers without any obligation to disclose such information publicly. See supra note 41.
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investing public never knows, therefore, what specific information the
credit rating agency uses to determine its ratings.29
Furthermore, the ability to generate financial models and make
sophisticated and appropriate assumptions is the skill the credit rating
agencies market, and it is to be expected that they will keep the
details of certain proprietary methodologies and procedures private.
Additionally, because of their conflicts of interest, rating agencies
may opaquely disclose-or may obfuiscate-their actual methods and
practices in order to hide the manifestations of their conflicts of
230
interest or their lack of due diligence and care. M sbaially,
however, the credit rating agencies evaluate information with the use
of financial models, methodologies, procedures, and more than a
handful of assumptions about the securities, issuers, industry, and
economy. It is simply impossible for an NRSRO to collect and
disclose all details of an analysis, every explicit and implicit
analytical assumption, every step of a model financial, and every
assumption and bias of every analyst and ratings committee member.
To the extent that nonpublic information, proprietary methodologies,
and obfuscation exists, the difficulty and the inability to disclose with
complete transparency is compounded. This difficulty is true to some
extent for all securities, but for more complex securities-those very
securities for which investors may more rely on rating agency
ratings--disclosure is even more limited.
2. Limits of Investor Sophistication and Vigilance
a. Coping with Complexity
The disclosure of complex transactions, structures, and analytical
methods "may well be either too detailed for many . .. investors..
to understand and assimilate, or too superficial to allow investors to
fully assess the [structure or] transaction and its ramifications. 3  In
regards to particularly complex products and transactions, such as the
structure of MBSs, CDOs, and other structured securities-not to
229 See U.S. SEC, 2003 CRA REPORT, supra note 34, at 33-34 (noting that whenever there
is a ratings change, there appears to be excess volatility in the market price of the issuer's
securities since the investor marketplace must make a guess as to whether or not, and to what
extent, the change was a function of nonpublic information).
23
"[C]onflicts [of interest] can undermine the reliability of disclosure." Schwarcz,
Rethinking, supra note 226, at 11. Loose disclosure requirements would exacerbate the
inclination of rating agencies to engage in such non-illuminating disclosure.
231Id at 5 (footnote omitted). For example, Enron's structured transactions were "so
complex that disclosure either would have had to oversimplify' the transactions or else provide
detail and sophistication beyond the level of both ordinary and otherwise savvy institutional
investors in Enron securities." Id at 6.
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mention the myriad of internal analysis dynamics, conflicts of
interests, and attempts (both sincere and otherwise) to manage such
conflicts within a particular credit rating agency--disclosure is
particularly problematic and may be particularly insufficient to
remedy informational asymmetry. 3
Otherwise sophisticated institutional investors may struggle to
understand complex disclosures or satisfactorily read between the
lines of overly simplistic disclosures. 3 Even professional securities
analysts have a limited ability to fully understand the modern
complexities of companies they follow.234  Indeed, the anecdotal
evidence presented earlier seems to indicate that even a credit
rating agency, an organization staffed by many hundreds of
professionally-trained risk analysts, struggled to understand the risks
inherent in the more complex structured products. 3 If these large
agencies find themselves without the resources to properly conduct
risk analyses, why is it reasonable to expect any investors, other than
the most resource-rich and sophisticated, to be capable of doing So?236
Investors may find it too difficult or too costly to determine what a
rating would have been, absent factors such as conflicts of interest;
scarcity of financial, managerial, or analytical resources; or an
inability to access information. 3
232 See id. (stating that in a world of complexity, disclosure can be insufficient to remedy
the "information asymmetry"). It is not the intent of this Article to argue for increased
transparency or to argue that the current level of expected transparency is justified; it is agnostic
on this point but merely suggests that disclosure is not necessarily a panacea. Issuers have
nonpublic information that must remain nonpublic, and credit rating agencies, in order to ensure
continued access to such information, must be required to keep this information confidential.
Furthermore, credit rating agencies must be able to keep some details of their proprietary
financial analysis tools confidential. And one cannot require a level of transparency which is
either impossible or too costly to achieve.
233 See, e.g., PARTNOY, supra note 84, at 302-05, 331 (arguing that Enron often disclosed
its off-balance-sheet transactions, even going as far as to note that they were not completely
arms-length transactions, but that the underlying reality of the transactions was so complex that
even the chair of the audit committee of Enron's board of directors, Robert K. Jaedicke, an
emeritus professor of accounting at Stanford Business School, "did not grasp" them); Schwarcz,
Rethinking, supra note 226, at 8 ("[E]ven sophisticated institutional investors can lack the
ability to understand derivatives transactions. .. )
234See PAPTrNoY, supra note 84, at 268 (noting that even for professional securities
analysts, who may intensely follow fifteen public companies, it would take a fuill day to fully
and carefully analyze a mere annual report).235 See supra Part lII.C.3.
236 Cognitive limitations and people's tendency to engage in herding behavior when facing
ambiguous choices may also hamper the ability of third parties to evaluate complex disclosures.
See Schwarcz, Rethinking, supra note 226, at 15 ("Complexity heightens ambiguity, which in
tun. .. allows people to see what they are already inclined to believe. Thus, the inclination to
follow the crowd is not surprising. Moreover, even for market professionals, it would be
difficult to change this behavior." (footnote omitted)); infra Part V.B.2.c.231 See Schwarcz, supra note 64, at 11I (expressing skepticism about the ability of
additional CRA disclosure requirements to benefit investors).
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However, even if it is the case that only the most
sophisticated and resource-rich institutional investors will be capable
of successfully scrubbing rating agency disclosures (provided they are
sufficiently detailed), evaluating their performance, and conveying
their findings to the marketplace, there remains reason to doubt that
they will actually do so. These are likely to be the same investors who
do not rely on ratings at all (or only to a very little extent) and are the
least vulnerable to rating agency inaccuracies. It may seem perverse,
but the most sophisticated and resource-rich, who are best-equipped
to close the disclosure loop and encourage the disciplining of rating
agencies, are also those who are least incented to review rating
agency performance. Indeed, the most sophisticated among them may
be able to take advantage of market inefficiencies created by
inaccurate ratings, 3 and, therefore, may prefer the existence of
inaccurate ratings and take no steps to evaluate and discipline the
rating agencies.
Additionally, it is not efficient for each investor to conduct its own
analysis of debt. To the extent they provide an economy of scale for
creditworthiness research and evaluation, the rating agencies provide
a valuable service to the investment industry. A full analysis of credit
rating agency ratings would require essentially duplicating the efforts
of each credit rating agency, obviating the purpose or supposed value
of the rating agencies altogether.
b. Evidence
One of the justifications for permitting the issuer-pays model to
exist seems to be that through disclosure of policies and efforts to
manage the conflict of interest investors will be able to appropriately
monitor the behavior of the rating agencies and appropriately discount
the ratings when the agencies' behavior is biased or sloppy. Given the
conflicts of interest associated with the credit rating agencies, their
opportunities to exercise poor judgment when conducting credit
analysis, their relative lack of transparency, and their history of
engaging in anti-competitive practices, it seems reasonable to ask
whether or not investors have been appropriately discounting the
opinions of the credit rating agencies in the past as a way to provide
insight into whether or not we can expect them to do so in the future.
238 Perhaps by issuing securities that are rated too high (and therefore, perhaps, priced too
high), or buying credit default swaps on securities which are rated too high, or by purchasing
securities which are rated too low (and therefore, perhaps, priced too low), or selling credit
default swaps on securities which are rated too low. For a description of credit default swaps,
see, for example, Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. GIN. L. REV. 10 19 (2007).
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The following anecdotes, which address only institutional
investors l -presumably those investors that possess superior
financial sophistication and analytical resources-should make one
wonder whether or not adequate investor sophistication actually
exists. There is strong anecdotal evidence that the investing
community, including such ostensibly sophisticated institutional
investors, is not, on average, sufficiently sophisticated to conduct
such monitoring and discounting.
Much has been written about the Enron debacle and the company's
bankruptcy filing in December 2001. Though their bankruptcy was a
sudden surprise to the vast majority of the investment community, 4
Professor Partnoy has argued that Enron often disclosed its
off-balance-sheet transactions, even going as far as to note that they
were not completely arms-length transactionS241-"There were
enough key details about [certain special purpose entities created to
provide off-balance-sheet transactions] in the footnotes to Enron's
financial statements to warn off any investor who read them." 242
Enron's disclosures also identified certain significant conflicts of
interest of key employees. 4 Yet Alliance Capital Management, a
large mutual fund and "one of the best-run,"2 gobbled up shares to
become Enron's largest shareholder by 2001 with 43 million shares. It
lost billions. Top managers at Alliance admitted after Enron's
bankruptcy that "the fund's managers did not dig into Enron's
footnotes, and did not uncover key details or even ask key
questions. 24
While the credit rating agencies' apparent failures with regard to
rating subprime mortgage-backed securities have come as a surprise
to many, this surprise is itself evidence of an inability to appropriately
discount ratings and a lack of complete investing sophistication.
There were signals along the way that these ratings should have been
viewed with suspicion. As early as 1994, academic and media
commentators were publishing observations indicating that something
might go awry, that the credit rating agencies were succumbing to
239 The vast majority of subprime MB~s and nearly all CDOs are bought and sold by
institutional investors. IOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 12.
20Fra detailed description of the growth and decline of Enron, see, for example,
PARTHoy, supra note 84.
241 Id at 302-03.
242Id. at 3 12.
243 Id. at 33 1.
244Id. at 411.
245M. (noting, too, that despite the investment loss having "decimated the investors in
Alliance's mutual funds," the portfolio manager nevertheless earned over $4 million in personal
compensation in 2000 and $2 million in 2001).
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behaviors incented by their interest in pleasing their issuer-customers
and conducting increasingly generous analysis, and that the ratings
assigned to MBSs were not accurate or reliable. 4 Did ostensibly
sophisticated investors take these developments into account when
deciding how credible, accurate, or defensible the MBS ratings were?
Given the evidence of broad and deep investor reliance on rating
agencies in relation to subprime securities and the extent of the
subprime losses, it seems that they did not.
Published accounts of the credit rating agencies and mortgage
backed securities since the m-id- 1990s noted that issuers typically
consulted and worked directly with the credit rating analysts to find
out how their MBSs and other asset backed securities could be
structured to obtain the highest rating for the largest possible pieces of
the asset pool-in other words, how to achieve the largest tranche
sizes with the very highest ratings.24 Published accounts since the
mid- 1990s reported that rating agencies competed on rating criteria in
a veritable race-to-the-bottom, each touting their more liberal criteria
and their reduced credit enhancement requirements in order to attract
more business, and, therefore, "potentially undermining the reliability
of the ratings. 248  Published accounts reported that agencies that
adopted such strategies did indeed gain market share.24 It was well
known that the rating agencies were enjoying tremendous revenue
246 See, e.g., Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36 (referring to numerous examples
where rating practices did not seem to conform to the "reputational capital" model); Schultz,
supra note 74 (noting that S&P, Moody's, and Fitch have all drawn criticism that they have
softened their criteria for mortgage-backed securities in order to win clients).
247 See, e.g., Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 19. As discussed above, the amount of
credit support (e.g., letters of credit, bond insurance, subordinated interests, cash collateral,
reinvestment of any excess cash generated by the pools) each tranche has plays a large role in
determining how risky that tranche is and, therefore, just how high a rating it could receive. See
supra note 20 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 19; Schultz, supra note 74 (reporting that
S&P had recently adjusted its ratings critenia allowing several securities to maintain their rating
even though the new criteria required on average 30 percent less credit support).
249 See, e.g., Cantor & Packer, supra note 3 6, at 19-2 1. Until the mid- I980s, S&P was the
undisputed leader in the NIBS and asset backed securities sector and was the only agency rating
mortgage backed securities not backed by a government or quasi-goverment agency such as
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fanny Mae). But in 1986, Moody's entered the
market with lower credit enhancement requirements -thus offering a less expensive, and
therefore more attractive, path to high ratings for the issuer-than S&P for certain mortgage
backed securities such that by 1989 Moody's share of the NIBS business exceeded that of S&P.
Then in 1990 Fitch entered the market with even more liberal credit enhancement requirements,
such that by 1994 Fitch was the NIBS market share leader. And in 1992, Duff and Phelps had
entered the market, also offering low credit enhancement requirements. By 1993, S&P had only
55 percent of the market share, in a sector where most issuers normally hire twvo rating agencies,
but S&P responded that year with reduced requirements for credit enhancements-such that,
within months, S&P regained 15 percent of the market share, largely at Moody's expense. Id
Analysts and the ratings agencies claimed that the on-going decline in credit enhancement levels
was due, in part, to their own learning curves about the performance of MBSs. Id at 2 1.
2009] DEEPLY AND PERSISTENTL Y CONFLICTED21
growth, almost entirely as a result of the growth in these structured
transactions 2 5 0 and that there was not only strong incentive to capture
as much of this growth as possible, but to contribute to its continued
growth.
In other words, there was reason to believe that the credit rating
agencies were helping to create the ravenous demand for the products
that facilitated the subprime mortgage crisis. By 2003, it was widely
reported in the popular financial press that an ever increasing
proportion of the mortgages originating in the U.S. were subprime
mortgages and that default rates were rising.25 Was it not evident that
the expansion of the subprime market was fueled by investor
enthusiasm for the U.S. housing market, specifically for highly-rated
MBSs and MBS-related CDOs?
Yet, instead of being punished, the credit rating agencies were
rewarded by the marketplace; institutional investor appetite for
mortgage-backed securities and CDOs based on them increased
voraciously until 2007, and the major credit rating agencies profited
handsomely as a result. Why? The institutional investors appear to
have been generally unable to fully understand the details of the
complex structures of these securities 252 or all the risks associated
with them. Nonetheless, it appears that for many institutional
investors, instead of choosing to avoid these securities, they relied on
the ratings. The result was that they considered the securities to be
relatively safe, at least relative to the returns being offered.
The Wall Street Journal's economics editor David Wessel has
recently referred to institutional investor purchases of RMvBSs as
"'myopic 253 and has stated that
investors who relied on the rating agencies-particularly
supposedly sophisticated pension funds and other
institutions-are at fault, too. Rating firms became a crutch
for investors who simply didn't want to spend the time and
250 See, e.g., id at 19; Schultz, supra note 74.
251 See, e.g., Patrick Barta, Mortgage Data Give Mixed Message on Market; Delinquent
Loans Decline, But Foreclosures Gain: Stress in Subprime Sector, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2003, at
A2 (quoting a credit analyst as saying that the subprime market is the "next shoe to drop" in
consumer finance); David Feldheim, Asset-Backed Deals Drive Market; Issuance in 2004 May
Top $800 Billion and Is Poised to Surpass Corporate Bonds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2004, at C4;
Erik Portanger & Paul Beckett, Banks Vie for Europe's Consumers; GE, Citigroup, BNP
Paribas Scrap to Gain the Edge in Fertile Market for Credit Cards, Subprime Loans, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 24, 2003, at ClI.
252 See, e.g., LOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 13 ("[S]ome institutional
investors when purchasing the more complex CDOs appear to have had little understanding of
the instruments or the underlying cash flow and security upon which the instruments derived
their value."); Cantor & Packer, supra note 36, at 19; Schultz, supra note 74.
253 David Wessel, Lessons from the Housing Bubble, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A2.
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money required to be prudent investors at a time when low
interest rates had everyone reaching for higher returns
without contemplating the higher risks. 254
Quoting Peter Fisher, a money manager at BlackRock Inc. and a
former Federal Reserve Bank of New York official, Mr. Wessel noted
in the same article that ... [flenders need someone to prevent them
from competing their way to the bottom. ,, 25 5
In a Wall Street Journal editorial, Arthur Levitt, Jr., the former
Chairman of the SEC, wrote:
[Wie need investors to accept more responsibility for
evaluating structured financial products. Credit ratings
agencies play a critical role in the capital markets, but their
judgments are guides, not stamps of approval. Too often,
institutional investors have been investing in sophisticated
credit products on the basis solely of the credit rating and
without fully understanding the inherent risks they are
undertaking. 2 56
More generally, Mr. Wessel, prompted by the institutional
investors who invested in MBSs, stated in his Wall Street Journal
column that "a big title at a big-name company is no guarantee of
smart, savvy management. 257 These institutional investors seemed to
be enticed by a bubble-and restricted by their own analytic
limitations. As a result, they were unable to appropriately discount the
opinions of a perceived authority, the credit rating industry. 5
254 Id. (emphasis added).
211Id (quoting Peter Fisher, former Federal Reserve Bank of New York official, now at
BlackRock Inc.).
256 Arthur Levitt, Jr., Op-Ed., Conflicts and the Credit Crunch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007,
at Al 15.
257 Wessel, supra note 69 (further suggesting that at least some senior executives
at prestigious financial institutions may suffer from "incompetence, imprudence, [and]
short-sightedness").
258 The question, for our purposes, is to ask whether or not the investing community took
these observations into account and appropriately discounted the opinions of the rating agencies.
When asking this question, it is necessary to be particularly wary of hindsight bias and
acknowledge that even rational, sophisticated, and fully formed investment decisionniaking can
yield undesired results. This is because nearly all investments entail some degree of risk, and
what may seem to be a bad investment decision in hindsight may have been an eminently
rational one at the time it was made. However, considering the foregoing discussion, anecdotal
evidence, and the fact that institutional investors, by at least one estimate, invested
approximately $7.5 trillion into these subprinie-based mortgage-backed securities, one just
might suspect that institutional investors in fact unsophisticatedly over-relied on the opinions of
the rating agencies, did not appropriately discount the AAA and AA ratings that typically were
attached to the highest tranches of these securities, and made poor investment decisions.
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c. Behavioral Finance and Bounded Rationality
Behavioral finance may shed light on this inability of investors, in
particular the collection of ostensibly sophisticated investors, both to
reduce their exposure to subprime MBSs and related products and to
realize that rating agencies might have been misleading them by
engaging in a fly-by-night strategy.
Behavioral finance is the branch of economics that studies the
irrational behavior of investors and other finance industry agents. It is
based in part on the findings of cognitive psychologists. 2 59 For
example, through experimentation, psychologists have discovered
that people have a tendency to anchor to initial values or judgments
and then may make insufficient adjustments in these values or
260judgments when provided later with more reliable information.
Such a bias may have contributed to a belief in the sustainability of
increasing U.S. housing prices over the course of the early
and mid-2000s or the belief that such prices would not fall. 6
Relatedly, behavioral finance shows that people generally exhibit
an availability (or representativeness) bias; they tend to use the
memories, recollections, and information that are the most available,
recallable, or salient-not necessarily the most relevant-in order to
form judgments, valuations, and estimates.262 In the mid-2000s, the
then-current housing prices and the housing boom were more salient
pieces of information than the prices and price volatilities of earlier
times. This availability bias, combined with the tendency to engage in
anchoring, may have exacerbated the belief in the security and the
profitability of investing in housing.
259It is also based in part on marketplace-inflicted "limits to arbitrage." See generally
Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in IlB HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONMICS OF FINANCE 1053, 1056, 1105 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rend
M. Stulz eds., 2003); see also HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: UNDERSTAND)ING
BEHAVIORAL. FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTING (oxford Univ. Press 2002);
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION To BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS I (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000).
260 Barberis & Thaler, supra note 259, at 1068. Anchoring may be a particularly influential
cognitive process in making judgments about the value of a financial security and the direction
of its future market price. Likely anchors in this regard may include the security's current price,
its most recent prices, and the prices of other seemingly related securities, whether or not the
relationship between the securities is relevant, and whether or not the relationship is one
that points to a relationship in fundamental valuation and changes in values. SHILLER, supra
note 13, at 149; see also Eldar Shafir & Amos Tversky, Thinking through Uncertainty:
Nonconsequential Reasoning and Choice, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 449 (1992).
21Despite such anchoring in the market, markets do make dramatic shifts, most
dramatically in the form of stock market crashes. Anchoring, when it slips, has the ability to slip
dramatically. SHILLER, supra note 13, at 155.
262 Barberis & Thaler, supra note 259, at 1068; see also Sunstein, supra note 259, at 5.
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People also often engage in herding behavior, 6 which in the
financial world can often result in economic bubbles264 -and crashes.
Psychologists have described the significant power of social influence
on individual judgment. 6 Such influences can be transmitted by
society at large or by authority figures.26 Often this dynamic of
having faith in authority figures presents no problem, since those in
such positions often are correct in their opinions.26  The more
interesting aspect of these psychology experiments is, however, that
people have a tendency to have faith in the reliability of the opinions
of authority figures even when their opinions contradict how an
independent observer would certainly conclude. 6 Consequently,
since rating agencies position themselves as authorities on credit risk,
their opinions, both accurate and inaccurate, may be overvalued by
investors, especially in situations of complexity or ambiguity-as
263 History is ripe with fascinating examples of extreme market bubbles, a type of herding
behavior. See, e.g., CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE
MADNESS OF CROWDS (Prometheus Books 2001) (1852) (describing "Tulipmania" and the
Great Railway Bubble); SHILLER, supra note 13 (describing the 1929 Crash, the October 1987
Crash, and the "Millennium Crash").
264Shiller defines a bubble as "a situation in which news of price increases spurs investor
enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from person to person, in the process
amplifying stories that might justify the price increases and bringing in a larger and larger class
of investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of an investment, are drawn to it partly
through envy of others' successes and partly through a gambler's excitement." SHILLER, supra
note 13, at 2.
265 See, e.g., SOLOMON AsCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1952); STANLEY MILORAM,
OBEDIENCE To AUTHORITY (1974).
266 See, e.g., MILGRAM, supra note 265, at 13-54; Morton Deutsch & Harold B. Gerard, A
Study of Normative and Informational Social Influences Upon Individual Judgment, 51 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629 (1955), discussed in SHILLER, supra note 13, at 157-59. In
Deutsch and Gerard's experiment, test subjects were asked a question, the answer to which was
not difficult to determine and usually answered correctly by individuals from a control group.
The test subjects were told, however, that all others who were being asked the same question
were responding with a different answer, a wrong answer. When then requested to answer the
question themselves, a third of the time the test subjects, often displaying signs of anxiety, gave
the identical wrong answer. Id Herding may be the result of using social proxies in situations
where one personally lacks adequate direct information to form an individualized judgment. To
disagree with consensus opinion puts one at risk of being thought of as foolish, ignorant, or
callous. Sunstein, supra note 259, at 9. This is an informational proxy, and is not an
unreasonable position to take, especially in matters of complexity or when one does not or
cannot process all the relevant underlying data. As Shiller writes, "[tihis behavior is a matter of
rational calculation: in everyday living we have learned that when a large group of people is
unanimous in its judgment on a question of simple fact, the members of that group are almost
certainly right." SHILLER, supra note 13, at 158.
267 SHILLER, supra note 13, at 159 ("[Pleople are respectful of authorities in formulating
the opinions about which the~y will later be so overconfide~nt, tranisferring their confidence in
authorities to their own judgments based upon them.").
2681d. ("[Milgram's experiments] demonstrate that people are ready to believe ...
authorities even when they plainly contradict matter-of-fact judgment.").
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when estimating the risk and values of complex structured
securities. 6
One of the necessary characteristics of a powerful herd-producing
"infection" is the existence of a salient and tell-able story to support
the infection. 7 In the case of the subprime debacle, the salient story
may have been that housing prices generally do not go down
nationwide. Observing that the credit rating agencies were issuing
ratings consistent with their beliefs about the housing market and the
riskiness (or relative lack thereof) of mortgage related securities,
investors may have been less inclined to doubt the credibility of the
rating agencies or to perceive, let alone criticize, the rating agencies'
inability to manage the issuer-pays conflict of interest. Ironically,
then, the housing bubble was created in part by the volume of credit
poured into the U.S. housing market by mortgage related securities
investors and may have also contributed to investors' beliefs in the
relative risklessness of these securities. 21Investing in the housing
market, then, contributed to their faith in the housing market, because
such investing bolstered that market. This circular dynamic was
unsustainable. 7
269 No less of an authority than Alan Greenspan, the then-Federal Reserve Board
Chairman, stated in 2004 that there can be no housing bubble since the "high cost and
inconvenience of moving [one's household] 'are significant impediments to speculative trading
and ... development of price bubbles."' Ip et al., supra note 69 (quoting former Federal Reserve
Board chairman Alan Greenspan) (omission in original). Mr. Greenspan would later confess in
regards to the subprime crisis, "Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending
institutions to protect shareholder's equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked
disbelief." Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at Al (reporting Mr. Greenspan's remarks to the U.S. House of
Representatives Oversight Committee).
270 SHILLER, supra note 13, at 166-69.
271 See Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Human Frailty Caused This Crisis, FIN. TIMES
(ASIA EDITION), Nov. 12, 2008, at 11I (arguing that bounded rationality and limited self control,
on the part of mortgagors and on financial institutions, caused the current economic crisis and
stating, "when things get complicated [humans] flounder."); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME
SOLUTION: How TODAY'S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRisis HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
1, 4 (2008) ("The subpnime crnsis ... is, at its core, the result of a speculative bubble in the
housing market that began to burst in the United States in 2006. . ... The view that the ultimate
cause of the global financial crisis is the psychology of the real estate bubble . .. has certainly
been expressed before. But it would appear that most people have not taken this view to heart,
and at the very least that they do not appreciate all of its ramifications.").
272 Informed institutional investors often contribute to the formation of bubbles and
securities misevaluations because of "limits to arbitrage." See, e.g., Barberis & Thaler, supra
note 259, at 1056-65; see also Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Vol. 17(2), Spring 2003, at 3, 24-25 (arguing that even informed investment
fund managers who believe that a stock is overvalued will nonetheless often follow the crowd
and hold the stock since doing so, among other things, reduces their risk that they will be
blamed by their sponsor for poor performance); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd
Behavior and Investment, 80 Am. ECON. REV. 465 (1990).
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It should be noted that bounded rationality and other human
cognitive limitations of course affect analysts in credit rating
agencies, too. Although there is ample evidence to believe that the
credit rating agencies acted with a significant degree of bad faith
when rating mortgage related securities, a more generous evaluation
of their involvement in the creation of the subprime crisis would posit
that these agencies, like investors, were convinced of the security of
the value of the housing stock ultimately underlying mortgage related
273
secunities. In this interpretation, rating agency analysts acted in
good faith but were bounded by their own limited rationality and
biased heuristics. Intuition would seem to suggest, however, that
given the force of the issuer-pays conflict of interest, ratings agency
analysts' rationally bounded and cognitive limitations might be
marshaled by issuers or otherwise affected in such a way that analysts
would be more inclined than not to bias their credit evaluations in
favor of issuers. In other words, because of the interaction between
the issuer-pays conflict of interest on one hand and their own bounded
rationality on the other, credit rating agencies personnel are
unknowingly susceptible to being persuaded by specious arguments
urging higher ratings.
It should also be noted that not every institutional investor relied
on the opinions of the credit rating agencies with regard to the
subprime-based MBSs. Given the thousands of institutional and
wealthy individual investors, analysts, and financial managers, some,
if not many, will be particularly rational, skillful, and sophisticated.
Indeed, some appear in retrospect to have been appropriately wary of
credit rating agencies' opinions regarding MB Ss. 2 74 Furthermore,
273 See SHILLER, supra note 27 1, at 50-51 ("[T]he rating agencies that pass judgment on
mortgage securities persisted in giving AAA ratings to mortgage securities that ultimately were
vulnerable because they too believed that there would be no bursting of the bubble. Even if [the
rating agencies] did harbor some doubts about the continuation of the boonm, they were not
about to take the drastic step of cutting ratings on securitized mortgage products on the basis of
the theory, not widely held, that home prices might actually fall. That would have been an
unusually courageous step-and one that was all too easily postponed in favor of other business
decisions that were easier to make, until it was too late."); see also, Richard J. Herring, Credit
Risk and Financial Stability, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, supra note 36, at 345, 353-60 (discussing how two heuristics characteristic of human
psychology-the availability heuristic and the threshold heuristic-lead to cognitive biases in
the estimation of low-probability, high-loss hazards, which may in turn cause the financial
system to become increasingly vulnerable to major losses during periods of financial stability).
274 Because of their size and human, technological, and economic resources, large
institutions with greater amounts of information gathering and analytical capabilities are liely
to exhibit superior sophistication and investing skill. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 74 (quoting
and then paraphrasing Edward Toy, a portfolio manager at Teachers Insurance and Annuity
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), in regards to mortgage backed
securities). At the time, TIAA-CREF was the world's largest pension fuind with $125 billion in
assets. According to Mr. Toy, "'As much as [TIAA-CREF) do[es] [its] own underwriting, [it]
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some not only concluded that MBSs were overrated by the credit
rating agencies and by the marketplace, but made money betting
against the U.S. housing market.2
3. Other Credit Rating Agencies
Disclosure by an NRSRO of its rating procedures and
methodologies and, as would be required under a rule currently
proposed by the SEC, of basic information on the underlying assets it
uses to rate each structured security will enable other NRSROs to
conduct unsolicited ratings on the same securities and effectively
opine about the accuracy of the disclosing NRSRO 's rating. In theory,
this process of obtaining second (and third and fourth)
creditworthiness opinions will both provide investors with additional
information and inflict some degree of discipline on disclosing
NRSROs who do not want their ratings to be criticized as persistently
inaccurate. If, over time, an agency's solicited ratings are perceived to
be less accurate than the unsolicited ratings of other rating agencies,
the reputation of the disclosing NRSRO will, in theory, suffer as
investors come to rely less on their ratings and issuers consequently
divert their business to other agencies believed to issue more accurate
unsolicited ratings.
However, it is not evident that adequate incentives exist for rating
agencies to conduct a sufficient number of such unsolicited ratings.
As an initial matter, rating agencies incur direct costs from doing the
analysis associated with conducting unsolicited ratings, yet receive no
fees from conducting them. Secondly, if benefits are to be derived
from issuing unsolicited ratings, such benefits are likely to be realized
only after a prolonged period-likely many years, if not a decade--of
still rel[ies] on the rating agencies to provide good, solid information and an objective viewpoint
as to where things are going' ..... 'To the extent they themselves are competing for business,
they lose credibility."' Id. (quoting Edward Toy, a TIAA-CREF portfolio manager). "If new
criteria put out by [the rating agencies] don't meet [TIAA-CREF]'s standards, the pension fund
may stipulate its own credit levels and put the agency ratings on the shelf.... To the extent this
results in a lower credit-enhancement level, [TIAA-CR-EF] will probably start demanding
[lower prices] on the securities it purchases, Mr. Toy says. 'If it means we start [passing on
some deals], so be it,' he adds." Id. (quoting Edward Toy, a TLAA-CREF portfolio manager).
Yet "smaller investors can't be so dismissive. Most don't have the extensive research staffs
maintained by larger investment firms and so rely on [credit] agency analysis." Id.
275 See, e.g., Jed Horowitz & Kate Kelly, How Long Can Goldman Dance?; Wall Street
Firm Sidesteps Subprime, Up to a Point; Average $662,000 Payday, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19,
2007, at C3; Gregory Zuckerman, Trader Made Billions on Subprime; John Paulson Bet Big on
Drop in Housing Values; Greenspan Gets a New Gig, Soros Does Lunch, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15,
2008, at Al (reporting that John Paulson earned $15 billion in 2007 for his hedge funds by
betting on the fall of the housing market).
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issuing such ratings. It takes time for one's reputation to grow,
especially in the case of a rating agency issuing creditworthiness
opinions. Here, patterns of accuracy (or inaccuracy) only reveal
themselves over time, if at all, as enough debtors perform or default
on their obligations, and such performance can be compared to the
earlier ratings issued by a rating agency. Such prolonged periods also
give NRSROs, whose ratings might be assessed and perhaps called
into question by such unsolicited ratings, ample opportunity to seek
short-term (and, indeed, medium-term) profits by issuing inaccurately
high ratings. NRSROs issuing inaccurate ratings are simply unlikely
to be "caught" in the short-term.
Thirdly, any benefits received from issuing unsolicited ratings
are uncertain and, given the costs involved with issuing unsolicited
ratings, such uncertainty may discourage a rating agency from
issuing them. This uncertainty stems from the existence of three
post-issuance scenarios. In one scenario, the unsolicited rating may be
accurate, even more accurate than the solicited rating, but such
increased accuracy may never be clearly demonstrated by debtor
performance. In another scenario, the disclosing NRSRO may have
issued an accurate rating, in which case there is no opportunity for the
rating agency issuing unsolicited ratings to be perceived as more
accurate than the disclosing NRSRO that issued the solicited rating.
In the third scenario, unsolicited ratings, even those issued in good
faith, may turn out to be inaccurate. Over time, such inaccuracies may
reveal themselves, and reputational harm would ensue. To compound
the threat of issuing inaccurate unsolicited ratings, the chance of
inaccuracy increases to the extent rating agencies issuing unsolicited
ratings do not have access to non-public information from the issuer.
Fourthly, in the case of new or small rating agencies, there may be
a risk associated with issuing ratings, unsolicited or otherwise,
appreciably different from the rating issued by the established
(reputable) NRSROs. A rating agency which opines differently from
the big boys-the NRSROs with plentiful resources and (deservedly
or otherwise) good reputations-bears the risk that the investor
community, at least in the short-term, will view its opinions as
inaccurate, even when its ratings are relatively accurate. This fact
may dissuade less established, risk-averse rating agencies from
issuing different, though more accurate, unsolicited ratings.
Finally, a rating agency may indeed be inclined to issue unsolicited
ratings, but for the purpose of soliciting future business-not for the
purpose of providing investors with an accuracy check on previously
issued NRSRO ratings-thus possibly undermining one of the goals
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of the disclosure requirements. For example, a rating agency using the
issuer-pays model may initially issue a particularly low unsolicited
rating on a security deliberately in order to encourage the issuer to
approach the agency and pay for the ability to engage in a dialogue
and convince the rating agency to increase its rating. Alternatively, a
rating agency may issue a particularly favorable rating in order to
attract future issuer business as these issuers seek out agencies that
are willing to provide a generous, racing-to-the-bottom service.
C. Potential Unintended Consequences of Regulation
In the years prior to the passage of the Credit Rating Agency
Reform Act, many commentators proposed that one of the solutions
to the problems posed by the credit rating agencies was to recognize
additional NRSROs and increase competition between them.27 The
Act has established a relatively transparent administrative process for
registering NRSROs, and, since the Act's effective date in 2007, ten
NRSROs have been registered, several more than were recognized
immediately prior to the effective date.2 As competition intensifies,
observers will be able to better assess whether or not such increased
competition has satisfactorily addressed the problems associated with
the credit rating agencies.
However, in an environment where there may be greater numbers
of NRSROs, it can be expected that, as a result of natural variation,
some agencies will tend to rate higher than other agencies. This
would be true even if all agencies were free of issuer capture. The
more competitors there are, the more likely it is that some agencies
will rate particularly highly, both relative to the other NRSROs and
relative to an accurate rating. The current and proposed regulations
will not prevent issuers from shopping for ratings, and issuers will
gravitate to those agencies that typically offer the most favorable
ratings at the lowest cost (costs include not merely the fees
charged by the rating agency but any costs incurred by investors
discounting the rating) .278  The existence of rating-dependent
issuers~279
regulations intensifies isur'demand for satisfactory ratings.
276 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
277 Sesupra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
278 It is reasonable to ask whether or not, if issuers are likely to successfully determine
which agency or agencies give the highest ratings, investors too will be able to come to a similar
determination and then appropriately discount the ratings from that agency or those agencies.
However, given the much closer working relationship between issuers and rating agencies than
between investors and rating agencies, and the intimate knowledge held by issuers of their own
securities, it would seem that issuers are far better positioned to recognize rating inflation.
279 See, e.g., Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 36, at 90 ("[T]here is an
argument that opening the [NRSRO] market to competition could make regulatory licenses
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Furthermore, agencies will be induced to grant more liberal ratings
since doing so will benefit their bottom lines, at least until any
reputational harm becomes incrementally more costly than the
benefits of doing so. Given the evidence contained herein, there is
strong reason to believe that when a larger number of NRSROs
compete more intensely for business, the likelihood of a more intense
race-to-the-bottom increases, and the bottom may be pushed lower.
Thus, in an environment where issuers demand generous ratings
and choose which rating agencies to hire and numerous NRSROs
more intensely compete for business, it seems inevitable that
securities will, on average, be rated too highly. In other words, despite
these regulations and the effectiveness of any firewalls to manage the
issuer-pays conflict of interest, there is still a race-to-the-bottom, and
valuations industry-wide are likely to be skewed high .280 And in this
particularly competitive business environment, we have already seen
that the bottom may be quite low. In order to compensate for this
persistent level of ratings inaccuracy, investors must always discount
appropriately. 28'
Another possible unintended consequence of the current regulatory
regime concerns the legitimization that both an NRSRO designation
and regulatory oversight convey. Some have argued that the source of
an NRSRO's positive reputation may not be based so much on its
ratings performance but on the fact that it has been recognized by the
SEC as an NRSRO. 8 When evaluating the credibility of an NRSRO
more important, by creating incentives for rate shopping among issuers."). Rating-dependent
regulations pose several problems and have been criticized by a number of commentators. See,
e.g., id. at 89 (suggesting that the regulatory use of ratings as benchmarks be abandoned);
Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36 (elaborating on the same argument).
280 Byway of contrast, a credit rating industry following a subscriber-pays revenue model
would not necessarily experience such a race-to-the-bottom, but rather, perhaps, a race-to-the-
top (except to the extent that regulated institutional investors might attempt to encourage
unjustifiably high ratings in an effort to invest in higher yield securities that would otherwise be
unavailable under rating dependent regulations).
281 On the other hand, it may be possible that newly registered NRSROs will be somewhat
unwilling to issue ratings substantially different from the ratings of the large, established
NRSROs. If a new NRSRO believes that its ratings, though different from those issued by other
NRSROs, are in fact more accurate, publishing such different ratings carres the risk of being
perceived by the marketplace as less accurate if the market's benchmarks are effectively the
ratings of those large NRSROs with long histories and established reputations. To some extent,
therefore, it may be possible that, until a newly registered NRSRO achieves a strong and
widespread reputation within the marketplace, it will engage in herding behavior and will follow
the lead of the established NRSROs. In such a situation the immediate added value of the new
NRSRO is nil, if not negative.
282 See, e.g., Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 36 (arguing that the only
value provided by an NRSRO is the regulatory license it can offer issuers); Partnoy, Two
Thumbs Down, supra note 36 (same).
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subject to a federal regulatory regime, many investors may now rely,
not merely on an agency's recognition as an NRSRO, but also on the
supposed strength of the regulations and the assumed vigilance of
others (e.g., the SEC, the marketplace) to adequately discipline the
NRSRO. The incentive for each member of the marketplace to
conduct independent evaluations is thus reduced, and an exercise in
widespread free-ridership may result. Since NRSROs are regulated
and subject to evaluation by the marketplace, the free-rider concludes,
NRSROs must be reputable and their ratings accurate. An
overabundance of such free-ridership may enable NRSROs to "slip
by" or fly-by-night without damaging their reputations at all.28 Such
a dynamic would, therefore, demand even greater willpower or
commitment on the part of the investor community to adequately
process NRSROs' disclosures and independently evaluate the
accuracy and credibility of their ratings, but that commitment may be
undermined perversely by the mere existence of the regulatory
environment.
VI. PUBLICLY FUNDED CREDIT RATINGS
This Article has highlighted both the significance of the credit
rating industry in modem capital markets and some of the problems
inherent in the credit rating industry under the current regulatory
regime, in particular problems associated with the issuer-pays conflict
of interest. One of the ways to address many of these problems is for
the rating agency industry to abandon the issuer-pays revenue model.
This seems unlikely. 284 As described previously, the issuer-pays
model solves the problem of procuring adequate analytical resources
and eliminates the need to keep ratings confidential from
non-subscribers. It also is a very profitable model. The issuer-pays
model could be prohibited, but such a step would seem drastic at this
stage-and the argument that it is appropriate for investors to bear
some burden to evaluate and assess the merits of credit ratings and to
discount them appropriately in the light of the existence of the
issuer-pays conflict of interest is not unpersuasive.
Others have proposed potential ameliorative steps to reduce
the problem of the issuer-pays conflict. Some of these suggestions
283 Or, the marketplace may conduct independent analysis of NRSRO performance, deem
NRSROs to be performing at a certain level of reliability, and stop devoting its energy to such
independent evaluation, thus opening up the opportunity for inferior agency practices to creep
back in.284 See supra Part l.B.
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include: (i) increasing competition between NRSROs; 285 (ii)
subjecting the credit rating agencies to civil liability for issuing
inaccurate credit ratings ;2 86 (iii) abandoning the use of rating
dependent regulations altogether and replacing them with
regulations which refer to alternative risk measurements ;28 7 and
(iv) having issuers pay into an independently managed pool, the
managers of which allot credit evaluation assignments and
payments to participating rating agencies .28 8 This Article discussed
some of the potential negative unintended consequences of
increasing competition between NRSROs in Part V.C. above. It
is beyond the scope of this Article to take a position on the
proposals to subject the rating agencies to civil liability, to
abandon ratings-dependent regulations altogether, or to establish a
revenue and assignment pool. However, the remainder of this
Article will discuss another, novel, ameliorative possibility: better
aligning the interests of ratings bodies to the interests of the public
by using public funds to pay for publicly available risk analysis.
A current topic of discussion within a number of academic
literatures is the private ordering of public functions 2 89  The
private-sector credit rating agencies often are used as examples of
such private ordering.290 The credit rating agencies provide a service
to the investing public. They also provide a service to the general
public, since the economic well-being of the general public is in large
part a function of the well-being of the economy generally. The raison
d'Etre of private sector, for-profit credit agencies, however, is not, in
fact, public service. Given that credit rating agencies perform a public
function effectively for the benefit of the investing public and the
285 See, e.g., supra note 176-77 and accompanying text.
286 See, e.g., Pinto, supra note 36, at 351-55; Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra
note 36. at 95-96.
287 E.g., Partnoy, Two Thumbs Down, supra note 36, at 704-09 (arguing for the
abandonment of ratings dependent regulations and replacing the ratings benchmark with risk
measurement which references credit spreads).
288 E.g., Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 53, 102-03 (2009).
289 See, e.g., Symposium, Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARv. L. REV.
1212; Symposium, Conference on Democracy and the Transnational Private Sector, 15 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2008); Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World,
31 YALE J. INT'L L. 383 (2006); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM.
L. REv. 1367 (2003); JOHN BRAITHwAJTE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: How IT WORKS, IDEAS
FOR MAKING IT WORK BETTER 8-11,20-23 (2008); BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 61.
2
"
8 See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 289, at 23, 25; King & Sinclair, supra note 79, at
353, 358 ("[Credit rating agencies] have acquired public authority due to their public
professional expertise, their specialist knowledge, and their reputation and acceptance by market
actors."); Saskia Sassen, Regulating Immigration in a Global Age: A New Policy Landscape,
570 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 65, 7 1-73 (2000).
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economy generally, it is eminently reasonable for such public
beneficiaries to pay for the services a credit rating agency provides. 29 '
Over the course of the 2000s, however, the major American
private credit rating agencies have negligently executed their public
function; they have taken advantage of their authority, have
preferenced their pecuniary interests over the public interest, and have
been identified as a primary contributor to the subprime meltdown,
disappearing wealth, and the worldwide credit crisis. This being the
case, it is worthwhile to consider whether these private-sector entities
require a public-sector competitor or complement or publicly-oriented
incentives to adequately execute their public function.
This vital public function may be better executed within a
plural governance structure, one in which both private and public
entities participate. Private, for-profit credit rating agencies (and the
reputation-protecting, self-regulating approach discussed herein) have
a role to play, but their performance and the effects of a regulatory
regime founded largely on public disclosure can be augmented and
improved by the participation of a public willing to pay for
substantive risk analysis conducted for the public good.29 This can be
done in at least three possible ways: (i) by creating a
taxpayer-funded public institution whose role is to conduct and
provide substantive risk analysis; (ii) by having the government pay
selected private rating agencies for rating services; and (iii) by
providing tax or other financial incentives to private rating agencies
that provide accurate ratings. Each of these proposals would have
their own implementation challenges, and it is not assumed that any
would provide a perfect solution to the existence of the issuer-pays
conflict of interest. However, each would better align the interests of
the ratings body to the interests of the public and may contribute to a
more effective financial governance regime. The following discussion
briefly introduces each of these three ideas in turn. While it is beyond
291 The funding source discussed here is a general tax on the general population. But it may
be more politically expedient, especially considering the fact that the most direct beneficiaries
of such a public agency are investors, for a tax to be levied on certain securities trades and/or on
particular institutional investors and for the proceeds of this tax to be earmarked for the public
rating agency. It should be noted that it is not the intention of this Article to imply that all
services which seem uniquely "public" should be provided by public, tax-funded entities.
Indeed, public services can be, and are often, provided solely by private entities. However, some
public services may be more effectively provided by public entities or by a collection of both
public and private entities.
292 TeWall Street Journal may have, inadvertently or not, hinted at such an idea when it
stated in an Opinion-Editorial, "[h]opefully [the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act] will prove
to be effective in mitigating the central problem with ratings agencies-their conflict of interest.
If not, then we should consider more direct methods to change who pays for ratings fees."
Levitt, supra note 256.
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the scope of this Article to provide the level of detail that would be
necessary to discuss the operational implementation of each program
or to comprehensively analyze all the obstacles and difficulties
associated with each, it will provide their fundamental characteristics
in the hopes of spurring further discussion and debate about their
respective potentials.
A. The Public Agency
1. Basic Description
The government could establish a taxpayer-funded government
agency that conducts substantive risk analysis similar to the risk
analysis currently carried out by the private credit rating agencies.
This public agency could be given the authority to determine for itself
which securities and which issuers to evaluate. This body could be
permitted to conduct substantive, merit-based credit evaluations and
other analysis on any security and any issuer, or on any class of
security generally, but could be expected to primarily use their limited
resources to rate those securities and those issuers that might most
significantly adversely affect the general public. Such securities are
most likely those that are the most complex and opaque, those for
which the investing public might appear to have an "irrational
exuberance," and those with the most potential to have an adverse
effect on the well-being of public beneficiaries and the financial
market as a whole. Often this will consist of large issuances, large
security categories, and new security categories. 9
In order to minimize political biases, it would be imperative that
this public agency be independent and shielded as much as possible
from political pressure. 9 This agency would also have to operate
with a great deal of transparency. It should make all of its analytical
tools and financial models, methodologies, procedures, and
assumptions publicly available and subject to public comment. There
would be no proprietary risk analysis models to protect; the public
would be entitled to access all of its information, except nonpublic
information received from issuers. Subject to the requirements of
confidentiality, this agency would make all of its reports and
evaluations, detailed and otherwise, readily publicly available.
293 
It may be politically necessary to restrict such a public agency from opining on the
credit risk of political jurisdictions, including U.S. states and foreign governments.
294Th Federal Reserve or the Supreme Court may provide an example of political
independence.
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In order to make the most informed evaluations, this agency ought
to have the power to request nonpublic information from issuers. An
issuer could choose whether or not to participate in the process, and
all nonpublic information made available would be required to be
kept confidential and used in accordance with applicable securities
regulations. Certain protections may be warranted in order to
encourage issuers to cooperate and to better ensure the efficacy of this
body's work. Such protections might include making all non-publicly
available information unavailable for any regulatory, tax, or criminal
enforcement action. 295 Issuers must have incentives to participate in
the process. Refusal to participate could be prompted by a strong
desire to keep trade secrets, to keep adverse information away from
the rating analysts, or to hide criminality, or because of some
generalized suspicion of the government's intentions and processes.
In cases where an issuer refuses to participate in the process and
refuses to make its nonpublic information available, the public agency
could publicly announce that the issuer chose not to participate. Such
lack of cooperation would then itself be public information, which the
investing public could use to inform its investing decisions.
This agency must also be provided with enough funding to enable
it to have the information collection and analytical capacity to make
credible and accurate ratings. Such funding must include a sizable
compensation budget in order to attract the most highly skilled, public
service oriented analysts and managers from the private-sector to
assure the quality and credibility of the agency's ratings.
2. Benefits of the Public Agency
This agency would provide a number of benefits. The most
obvious benefits result from the fact that this agency would not be
faced with the conflicts, biases, and costs created when issuers pay for
rating services. Since this agency would operate from the influential
platform of a government agency with a voice of presumed authority
and since its methodologies and procedures will be readily publicly
available, it is likcely that its methodologies and procedures will be
regularly and rigorously examined and commented on by leading
academics in the field and that a dialogue between the public agency
and private experts will be created, thus increasing the accuracy of the
295 The U.S. federal tax code provides for similar protections that effectively encourage
illegal immigrants to pay personal income taxes. See Cynthia Bloom, Rethinking Tax
Compliance of Unauthorized Workers After Immigration Reform, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595,
596-603 (2007) (discussing how Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code "has prohibited the
IRS from taking the initiative to reveal the lack of immigration authorization to the immigration
authorities").
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agency's opinions. These exchanges, together with equal access to
296
information and analytical resources, provierao to anticipate
that the ratings and other opinions of this public agency may be, on
average, more accurate than those of the private rating agencies. 9
Of course, it is possible, but not inevitable, that such a public
agency may be subject to its own biases (e.g., over conservatism,
political capture), thus reducing the accuracy of its creditworthiness
opinions. However, whatever biases this agency might have would be
different than those embedded in the issuer-pays conflict of interest
associated with most private credit rating agencies.
Given its unbiased, or differently biased, analysis, the opinions
issued by this body would provide informational value different from
that embedded in ratings issued by the private-sector agencies.
Consequently, the opinions of such a public agency would challenge
and inject texture into the environment of private ratings. Individual
members of the investment public, when making investment
decisions, would be in a position to take into consideration-in
addition to their own independent analysis and the opinions of the
private credit rating agencies-the ratings and information provided
by this independent public agency. Thus the investment community
will be able to make more informed, more skeptical, and, on average,
more appropriate investment decisions.
Under this proposal, no recommendation is being made to change
the current credit rating agency regulatory scheme or to change or
eliminate the private rating agencies. The private rating agencies
would function within the existing regulatory scheme, in parallel with
the public agency, and investors could decide how to use, how to
interpret, and to what extent to rely on each of their respective
opinions. In essence, the public agency would only be providing
additional information-risk opinions not tainted by biases in favor of
296 Including technological resources and human skills.
2971It is not this Article's claim that this public agency would always necessarily issue more
reliable ratings than the private credit rating agencies. See Schwarcz, Rethinking, supra note
226, at 26-27 ("There is little current literature on government certification of securities quality
because, until recently, disclosure was seen as the complete answer."). The individuals staffing
this body would cope with limited institutional, analytical, and informational resources,
competing pressures, uncertainty, professional biases, and cognitive limitations. This agency
would not be able to be completely transparent, in part because of the difficulty of revealing all
analytical processes and the limits to self-knowledge, but also because nonpublic information
must be kept confidential. Analysts' personal conflicts of interest must still be managed.
However, this agency would be immune from the perverse agency conflicts of the issuer-pays
conflict. It would not face competitive pressure and would not be faced with the conflicts of
interest associated with ancillary services. It may also be able to analyze more carefully and
thoroughly, without the time pressure of producing product for its clients.
296 Vol. 59:2
2009] DEEPLY AND PERSISTENTLY CONFLICTED27
issuers-and investors would be free, as they are now, to make their
own investment decisions.
A public credit rating agency would also give legislators and
regulators another option to choose from and use in establishing
ratings-dependent regulations. When crafting investment-restricting
regulations, regulators would be able to choose the ratings of the
public agency as regulatory risk benchmarks or may choose a set of
options, one of which may be the pubic agency's ratings. 9 When
discussing rating-dependent regulations and the NRSRO designation,
Professor Richard Sylla and others have hinted at the value of a
public-sector rating process. For example, Richard Sylla has asked:
Should representative governments be in the business of
passing out [NRSRO] designations if the designees are
thereby allowed to profit from selling regulatory licenses? Or,
if ratings are to be incorporated in financial regulations, is it
possible that regulatory authorities have a responsibility to
come up with, and apply, their own ratings?299
In an environment of increasingly global interconnectedness, this
governance issue is particularly important. Aaron Unterman's
argument encouraging the establishment of an "international capital
organization" not only highlights the importance of this issue' 3 00 it
also strongly hints that the issuance of credit ratings should not be left
solely to private-sector credit rating agencies.30 Mr. Unterman
explicitly states that such a public credit regulatory body "should also
monitor and report on macroeconomic developments and trends of
concern to capital market operation," 302 and that such an international
entity "could play an influential role, monitoring information received
by rating agencies for systemic threats, and offering ratings guidance
and instruction to [rating agencies].*,0
The suggestion that there should be a government entity explicitly
charged with protecting consumers of financial products has gained
298 It is beyond the scope of this Article to opine as to the desirability of rating-dependent
regulations. But see Partnoy, Not Like Other Gatekeepers, supra note 36 (arguing for the
discontinuation of ratings-dependent regulations).
299 Sylla, supra note 37, at 38.
30 Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization of U.S.
Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 131-32 (2008).
301 Id at 131 ("The role of credit ratings in the international capital market is paramount
and should not be entrusted to private firms.").302Id.
303 See Unterman, supra note 288, at 106. "It is highly unlikely that an objective
international agency overseeing the ratings industry would have allowed the unrealistic ratings
which plagued the market, and contributed to the current crisis." Id. at 107.
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considerable traction in the recent year. The Department of the
Treasury and eminent scholars Professor Elizabeth Warren and
Professor Robert Shiller have each outlined plans for a consumer
product safety commission. Although their suggestions appear to
focus on the protection of individual financial product consumers
(e.g., mortgagors and credit card holders) and do not explicitly call
for anything termed a governmental rating agency, their suggestions
do clearly incorporate the idea that a government entity be actively
engaged in the substantive evaluation and dissemination of financial
products riskYH0
3. Responses to Certain Arguments Against the Establishment of a
Public Agency
Some may be opposed on free market principles to the
suggestion that the government conduct merit-based evaluations
of private enterprise securities issuers, but such activity by
government authorities and quasi-governmental organizations is not
unprecedented. State securities regulators often conduct merit-based
evaluations of securities pursuant to "blue sky" laws in order to
determine whether or not certain securities can be marketed within
the state.30 The Securities Valuation Office ("SVO") of the National
Association of Insurance Commnissioners ("NAIC") conducts
substantive risk analysis to determine how it will evaluate the
riskiness of certain securities held by insurance companies, especially
in cases where there is a split rating or a disagreement between two or
more private credit rating agencies. 3 06
30 US DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A
MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 14, 19-21 (2008) (summarizing the
Treasury Department's proposal to establish a Business Conduct Regulator because "[blusiness
conduct regulation .. includes key aspects of consumer protection"); SHTIL[ER, suipra note 27 1,
at 129 ("[A step to correct] the inadequacies of our information infrastructure, as outlined by
legal scholar Elizabeth Warren, would be for the government to set up what she calls a financial
product safety conmnission, modeled after the Consumer Products Safety Commission. Its
primary mission would be to protect the financial consumer, to serve as an ombudsman and
advocate. It would provide a resource for information on the safety of financial products and
impose regulations to ensure such safety. Remarkably, such concern for the safety of financial
products is not the primary charge of any major financial regulatory agency in the United States
today."1).
30 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 8. 1, at 320-22 (5th ed.
2005) (discussing blue sky laws' merit-based paradigm).306See National Association of Insurance Commissioners, NAIC Securities Valuation,
http://www.naic.orglsvo.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) ("[The SVO] is responsible for the
day-to-day credit quality assessment and valuation of securities owned by state regulated
insurance companies."); see also Cantor & Packer, supra note 3 6, at 6, 9 ("[T]he SVO staff is
free to assign a rating that differs from the bond's public credit rating as long as their judgment
implies a downgrade from the corresponding public credit rating. In practice, the svo
concentrates its resources on (1) determining a quality category for unrated private placement
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Some may argue that an independent taxpayer-funded rating
agency would be unable to attract skillful analysts and would likely
do a worse job at evaluating risk than private agencies. 0 It appears
true that analyst and manager compensation must be appropriately
high in order to establish and maintain a satisfactory level of
institutional risk analysis skill. However, working in such a public
interest oriented agency may be particularly appealing to skillful,
intelligent, public interest minded financial analysts and economists,
and the compensation need not necessarily be equal to that offered in
private practice. Such a public agency, especially if it becomes
highly reputable, may be a place for experienced analysts to cap an
honorable career and a place for young, ambitious, highly skilled
analysts to begin one.30
Others may argue that the establishment of a public agency may
undermine the market for private credit rating analysts, thereby
eliminating any reduced information asymmetry resulting from the
private analysts .309 However, according to this proposal, the public
agency would only provide information to investors, and the
marketplace of investors would decide which agencies' opinions it
will value. Increasing competition between NRSROs has been
advocated as a way to improve the accuracy of the agencies and
eliminate those agencies whose opinions were not valued; 310 a public
agency would merely participate in that competition. The loss of any
private jobs would merely be the result of the consensus of the
marketplace that the information provided by the public agency so
seriously undermined the reliability of a private-sector rating agency
that it could no longer charge the fees it had been charging or could
no longer survive. 1
securities and (2) resolving differences of opinion among the agencies, where the svo may
choose either the higher or lower rating. At the cost of establishing the capacity to undertake
independent analysis, the NAIC has developed a discretionary use of ratings that calls for
judgment in the interpretation of split ratings and permits certain ratings to be discounted if they
are viewed as too high.").
307 See, e.g., Schwarcz, Rethinking, supra note 226, at 27-28.
308 See JoHN BRAITHWAITE, MARKETS IN VICE, MARKETS IN VIRTUE 202 (2005)
(discussing the integration of private and public markets and how the public markets might be
able to attract the best professionals).
309See, e.g., Schwarcz, Rethinking, supra note 226, at 27-28.
310 See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
311 Of course, given that this agency will have the platform of a federal government
agency, the authority of its voice may be overvalued, but at least its voice will be untainted by
the pervasive conflict faced by the private agencies, which has created havoc in entire
economies and threatens to do so again.
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B. Government Paying for Private Rating Services
Instead of using public funds to establish an independent body to
conduct credit risk analysis, public funds could be used to hire private
credit rating agencies that shun the issuer-pays revenue model or, as a
result of government funding, are willing to move away from the
issuer-pays model to conduct credit analysis on selected securities. In
this regard the public would act effectively as the paying client of a
credit rating agency that relies on the subscriber-pays revenue model.
Earlier this decade, investigations into and criminal charges
against several Wall Street investment banks and brokerage firms,
whose securities analysts were believed to be issuing overly favorable
opinions on public equity securities as a result of the conflicts of
interests experienced by the analysts, 1 led to the establishment of the
so-called independent research mandate. The independent research
mandate, part of a larger settlement reached between these Wall
Street firms and various federal, state, and industry regulators,
required that these firms pay independent securities research firms to
conduct research on equity securities and make this independent
research available to their customers. 1 The independent research
mandate provides an analogue-although an inexact one-to the
proposal made here that public funds be used to pay for independent
credit analysis. 3 14
In this scenario, although it eliminates the conflict of interest
associated with the issuer-pays revenue model, the hired agencies
may be tempted to issue overly conservative ratings instead of the
most accurate ratings on the belief that such conservatism might be
favored by the government regulators charged with awarding
contracts to the rating agencies. Since they are involved in an activity
312 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
33e Press Release, U.S. SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle
Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003 -54.htm; U.S. SEC, SEC FACT
SHEET ON GLOBAL ANALYST RESEARCH SET-rLEMENTs, Apr. 28, 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm [hereinafter U.S. SEC, GLOBAL ANALYST FACT
SHEET].
314 The analog is inexact in that under the independent research mandate Wall Street finns
select and pay the independent securities analysis finns (although arguably these payments are
derived at least in part from revenues generated indirectly from the investing public). The
independent research mandate was to last for only five years and required that the firm pay only
a total of S432.5 million for independent research. U.S. SEC, GLOBAL ANALYST FACT SHEET,
supra note 313. There is some doubt that the investing public actually made much use of the
independent research mandate. See, e.g., Judith Bums, Independent Stock Research Hasn't Been
a Must-See, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2005, at B3 (noting that in the first year of availability few
investors accessed the independent research reports and some of the information provided may
have been untimely and less than useful).
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which is designed to promote financial stability and the efficient
workings of the capital markets, such regulators might reasonably be
perceived (correctly or incorrectly) to favor overly conservative credit
evaluations more protective of the investing public. Nevertheless,
despite this possible bias, the ratings issued by hired agencies would
provide informational value different from that embedded in ratings
issued by other private-sector agencies, and investors could take into
consideration the ratings and information provided by the hired
agencies when making their investment decisions. These ratings'
potential conservative bias, however, may make them inappropriate
candidates to be used as the reference ratings in rating-dependent
regulations. Such a bias would unduly dampen the flow of money
within the capital markets.
Professor Roger B Myerson, a 2007 Nobel Prize winner in
economics for his work on the design of economic institutions, 1
recently seemed to suggest that having the government pay private
rating agencies for rating services in certain circumstances was
preferable to the current system. He wrote, "Should debt securities
that are held by regulated banks and pension funds be rated by
multiple independent credit reports that have been commissioned by a
federal agency, or should we continue to let the issuers of debts
decide who will rate their risks?" 316
C Tax Incentives to the Rating Industry
Instead of providing direct public payments to the rating agencies
to conduct risk analysis as discussed above, it may be possible to
provide tax credits to those private rating agencies that are able to
demonstrate they have provided accurate risk analyses. In such a
proposal, it would be necessary to devise some measurement of
ratings accuracy and then establish accuracy benchmarks. Rating
agencies that meet these benchmarks would receive tax credits, thus
incentivizing them to provide accurate ratings-a force that could
counteract the influence of the issuer-pays conflict of interest. This
counteracting force could be strengthened or weakened by lowering
or raising the accuracy benchmarks and/or by raising or lowering the
amount of tax credits available.
315 Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2007 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobeljrizes/econormicslaureates/2007/Press.html.
316 Questions for Mr. Geitlsner, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at A3 1 (one of the three
questions Professor Myerson would have liked Timothy Geithner, President Obama's nominee
for Treasury Secretary, to answer during his appearance before the Senate Finance Committee).
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The most obvious difficulty in such a scheme would be the
creation of the accuracy measurements and the creation of a
verification program. The measurements would likely entail an
evaluation of the accuracy of each agency's historic ratings over some
recent number of years. Tax credits would be earned, therefore, only a
certain number of years after the ratings have been issued, so a
chronological mismatch between the historical rating performance
and current financial reward would be inevitable. The amount of tax
credits each rating agency earns could be made publicly available in
order to provide the investing public with additional information
about the historic accuracy of these credit rating agencies. Such a tax
reward system, however, would not necessarily signal which rating
agencies were providing accurate ratings in real time.
It may also be impossible to reward only deserving agencies
and completely avoid rewarding non-deserving agencies, since there
will be at times a misalignment of actual agency performance
and apparent (or retrospective) performance. 1 Any historical,
retrospective analysis of actual debtor performance would not
necessarily differentiate, for example, those agencies that had been
conducting risk analysis with high levels of skill, competence, and
diligence from those that were merely the beneficiaries of good luck.
Many times ratings that prove to be accurate in retrospect (based on
whatever measurement methodology is used and thus entitling a
rating agency to tax benefits) will have resulted from good luck
benefiting an agency that in reality had conducted sloppy analysis.
Conversely, many times ratings that prove to be inaccurate in
retrospect and do not elicit tax benefits may have indeed been
determined with particular skill, diligence, and competence, and it is
only bad luck (from the perspective of the credit rating agency) that
yielded the conclusion that the rating was inaccurate. Sometimes, for
example, creditworthy debtors default, and often risky debtors pay on
schedule. The sheer number of ratings conducted by most rating
agencies and the need to reward agencies based on their average
performance, however, may neutralize this potential misalignment.
CONCLUSION
The reformns contained in and directed by the Credit Rating
Agency Reform Act have only recently been implemented. Though
this Article argues that there are substantial reasons to doubt the
effectiveness of these reforms and that these reforms have not
317 It is important to keep in mind that a rating is an evaluation or prediction of the
uncertain future.
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adequately addressed the problem of the issuer-pays conflict of
interest, much of the current regulatory regime exists to try to enable
the marketplace to try to manage this very problem. Perhaps, going
forward, investors will come to adequately discount the opinions of
the rating agencies; perhaps rating agencies will find that there is
rarely an occasion when short-term profit incentives outweigh any
threat to their reputations; perhaps rating agencies that shun the
issuer-pays model will displace the traditional rating agencies.
Perhaps. Time will tell to what extent the Act is effective-if, indeed,
it is effective at all.31 Unfortunately, it would appear to be a difficult
task to determine the actual effectiveness of these reforms, and it may
even require another economic downturn or securities debacle to
reveal persistent rating agency misbehavior .31'9 Nevertheless, a very
healthy skepticism of these reforms' effectiveness is eminently
warranted, especially in light of the empirical and anecdotal evidence
presented here.
Mortgage-backed securities and the collateralized debt obligations
based on them are complex securities, and, as a result, many investors
appear to have relied on ratings as informational, analytical, and risk
assessment proxies for their own due diligence. In the case of
subprime mortgage-backed securities and related products, such
reliance may have been misplaced and seems to have cost investors
dearly. But mortgage-backed securities are only one of several
complex and opaque securities instruments available today to the
investment comunity.32 Financial innovation is likely to produce
more and increasingly complex and/or opaque investment products.
Furthermore, capital markets are increasingly interrelated,
interdependent, and global, which contributes to the potential to
create increasingly complex securities and systemic risk.32
318 NwYork State's attorney general, Andrew Cuomo, announced in 2004 that the state
had reached an agreement with Moody's, S&P, and Fitch pursuant to which firms would be paid
for conducting unsolicited ratings and would be required to conduct some level of due diligence
regarding residential MB3Ss. Aaron Lucchetti, Bond-Rating Shifis Loom in Settlement-N.Y's
Cuomo Plans Overhaul offHow Firms Get Paid, WALL ST. J., June 4,2008, at ClI. However, the
agreement has not been formalized, the details of the agreement have not been released
(including details regarding fees and payments), and the agreement is to terminate in three
years. Id; see also Ainir Efrati & Aaron Lucchetti, US. News: Cuomo Blazes Own Trail as
Wall Street Cop, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2008, at A3.
319 See White, supra note 47, at 49-50 ("There is no absolute standard against which an
industry can be judged, and judgments with respect to innovation within the credit rating
industry do seem particularly difficult.").
320 Others include collateralized debt obligations generally, credit default swaps, other
derivative instruments, hybrid and/or synthetic versions of each and even hedge funds whose
investment strategies are kept relatively opaque to its own investors. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
321 See IOSCO, SUBPRIME REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
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In a world of increasing complexity and opacity, investors may
find it increasingly difficult to engage in their own risk assessments,
and, even if they could do so, for all of them to do so would be
increasingly inefficient. Rather, investors may continue to rely on
rating agencies, financial analysts, and other informational proxies to
provide reliable information about the risks and values of securities
and on the most resource-rich and skillful institutional investors to
bring market prices in line with fundamental values and to discipline
analyst and rating agency misbehavior. Those truly sophisticated and
resource-rich industry players, however, may take advantage of the
increasing informational asymmetry and their investment capabilities
by innovating, creating, and selling complex financial products and
pocketing fees along the way or by creating trades in hard-to-value
(and therefore often mis-valued) securities designed for the purpose
of receiving abnormal returns. 2 Furthermore, some undeserving
participants within the industry are likely to be positioned, like
subprime mortgage originators and mortgage brokers, to divert a
portion of the generous flow of funds from investors into their own
personal coffers.
The financial system may come to look increasingly like a wealth
re-distribution system shifting wealth from the masses of individual
investors, less sophisticated institutional investors, and mom-and-pop
beneficiaries to the exceptionally well-skilled and resource-rich, and
the luckily well-positioned. If this is an undesirable function of capital
markets, or if it is a function that should be constrained, then
regulatory innovation, sometimes based on public-private governance
structures such as those introduced in this Article, will be necessary to
facilitate transparency and a broader and deeper understanding of
entities that have profound public impact but currently benefit from
opacity, complexity, and imprecise or poorly designed regulation.
322 
It is not this Article's intention to discourage financial innovation. Financial innovation
is often beneficial. For example, innovation may disperse risk and lead to increased overall
financial stability and often allows otherwise restricted investors to participate in desirable
investments.
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